

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030005-1

4 DECEMBER 1979

NO. 2053

1 OF 1

JPRS 74705

4 December 1979

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2053



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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50272-101		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74705		2.		3. Recipient's Accession No.																																																	
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE																																																							
4. Title and Subtitle NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2053				5. Report Date 4 December 1979																																																			
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7. Author(s)				8. Performing Organization Rept. No.																																																			
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201				10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.																																																			
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12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above				13. Type of Report & Period Covered																																																			
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16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political, and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.																																																							
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b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms																																																							
c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, 15																																																							
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161				19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED		21. No. of Pages 65																																																	
				20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED		22. Price																																																	

(See ANSI-Z39.18)

See Instructions on Reverse

OPTIONAL FORM 272 (4-77)
(Formerly NTIS-35)
Department of Commerce

JPRS 74705

4 December 1979

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2053

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SUCCESS OF PALESTINIAN DIPLOMACY SAID TO ABROGATE NEED FOR VIOLENCE

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 27 Oct 79 pp 26-27

[Editorial by Fu'ad Matar]

[Text] Diplomacy and diplomats have fallen to the lot of the Palestinian revolution, and this diplomacy in recent months has made some sparkling achievements, with more ahead to be achieved.

The thing that is helping Palestinian diplomacy to make these achievements is that its men are activists on behalf of a major issue, not to mention being participants in fashioning Palestinian policy, not merely the ones who carry it out. Their being participants in decision-making gives them flexibility in give-and-take and strength in negotiation.

Furthermore, the methods of the Palestinian revolution's leader, Yasser 'Arafat, in dealing with the Arab nations has eliminated through Palestinian diplomacy the reservations of the world's nations, on whose doors the Liberation Organization is knocking, requesting reconsideration of a position or positions. Austria was not upset by the fact that its official reception of Yasser 'Arafat caused the Arab nations to be angry, nor was Spain upset either. When 'Arafat visits France, the French nation will be confident that all Arabs, excepting President Anwar Sadat, will be pleased by its reception of Abu 'Ammar. When French doors are opened to the leader of the Palestinian revolution, other doors will open in Europe, and everyone will be confident that they will not thereby provoke dissension between the Arab nations and the Palestinians.

The moderation of these countries upon whose doors Palestinian diplomacy has knocked, or the countries whose doors will be knocked upon in the future, might not be as plentiful as the Palestinian spokesman favors, but these countries prefer this method of give and take to the method of listening to the Palestinian voice through operations in the air or on land or sea. This does not mean that the method to which we refer has not achieved its goal. On the contrary, it was one of the means of

applying pressure which was useful in opening those doors closed to Palestinian diplomacy and which led through give and take with it to the situation's new substance and conclusions.

Just as the goal of Arab diplomacy was to persuade the United States to reconsider some things in its policy regarding Israel, the goal toward which Palestinian diplomacy strives is to get the American administration to acknowledge the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own fate and to establish their own state. We do not know whether the result of the Palestinian effort with respect to this matter will be the same result toward which the Arabs are headed. The American position is so far still not what the Arabs want; it only takes into account Israel's security and Israel's demands. The reason for a lack of radical change in the American position might be that the Arab oil weapon has not been used as a means to force the American administration to reconsider its position as the Arabs would like.

The importance of the Palestinian diplomatic activity is that it allows the Palestinian revolution to converse directly with others instead of a dialogue through a third party. It can talk with Austria directly instead of an Arab party undertaking discussions with Austria, and it can reach an understanding with Spain on broad outlines instead of an Arab quarter being delegated to do that. It is dealing with Turkey instead of through a third party, and it is in a dialogue with France, the nation, directly, instead of the dialogue being through an Arab party or through French friends of the Palestinian revolution or French political forces allied with this revolution.

We say this while taking into account that the third party, who was a proxy for the Palestinian revolution in the dialogue or conversation or give and take, was sincere and did that out of zeal for the Palestinian revolution and not with the aim of defaming this image. However, there are judgements which the third party cannot consent to without consultation with the Palestinian revolution, whereas the direct contact guarantees saving time, or rather conserving efforts.

It might be said that the power of Arab diplomacy is concealed in the fact that it possesses a weapon which strengthens its arguments and logic, and helps to impose certain conditions at times or to obtain many demands at other times. The weapon that we mean is the oil weapon which some have, the monetary weapon which some others have, the weapon of strategic location which others have, and the weapon of support of the Soviet Union which a considerable number have.

Saying something like this is realistic, but Palestinian diplomacy in turn has an effective weapon like the oil weapon, the monetary weapon, and the rest of the various kinds of weapons possessed by Arab diplomacy. The Palestinian weapon that we mean is the weapon of violence represented by

the operations which were the object of resistance of some countries and which despite their legality and the Palestinian's right to carry them out, were suspended temporarily, since no one should need further evidence. The suspending of these military operations does not mean that the Palestinian revolution has got to the point of wearing a riding coat and velvet gloves instead of a checkered kaffiyah, and carrying dossiers in its hands instead of a kalashnikov. Because that is not the supposition, it is sufficient to say that the decisions of the diplomatic initiative are debated in the military operations room, i.e., that this room is continuously ready for every contingency for which it was established in the first place.

Returning to carrying out military operations, objected to by the nations at which the Palestinian diplomatic initiative is aimed, the monetary weapon, the weapon of strategic location, and the weapon of support of the Soviets in the area. It is certain that the nations which have begun a new era of diplomatic dealings with the Palestinian revolution will move as quickly as possible, in the event of the Palestinian revolution's being forced to return to the use of that weapon, to see that that does not happen. At the present time, the effort would not be comparable to the effort which would accompany some of the oil nations' alluding to the use of the oil weapon. But with the expansion of its area, it would become like that.

Furthermore, reliance on diplomatic effort on the part of the Palestinian revolution would of itself constitute an experimental situation for the revolutionary leadership on the pursuit of diplomatic activity, aside from achieving a requisite balance in the present stage. How?

Let us take as an example what one of the most prominent military leaders of the Palestinian revolution did a few days ago. We mean Abu Jihad, who for a 2-year period during the Lebanese war led operations of extreme importance. A few days ago, from Teheran where he was visiting, Abu Jihad summoned the directors of the PLO offices in the Gulf states to Teheran and held a meeting with them. Obviously that was as if Cyrus Vance went to Athens, summoned the United States' ambassadors in the Middle East and held a conference with them to discuss certain important issues before making some decision or other. Or it was also as if the French foreign minister or the Japanese foreign minister or the Chinese foreign minister did the same thing.

Obviously the matter is being done without sensitivities, which means that what Abu Jihad did was supposed to be done by Abu al-Latif. Such sensitivities as these continually arise when the diplomacy is traditional. Since the Palestinian diplomacy is revolutionary diplomacy, all of the leadership is able to stay clear of bureaucracy and the peculiarities of positions, because it is zealous in its goal, especially since the returns of any success is ultimately for the revolution and not for a person.

Experiments such as these are necessary as long as the story of the Palestinian state increases and crystallizes with each success achieved by Palestinian diplomacy, and as long as "revolutionaries" become transformed into "statesmen."

This is the experimental aspect. As regards the question of balance, it can be said that diplomatic effort achieves a flexibility and neutrality that is impossible for military effort to achieve. With military effort, the revolution can only deal with those who supply it with assistance and arms. But with diplomatic effort, it can be active in reaching those who are not only not giving assistance but also those who are taking positions against the Palestinian revolution. As an example, in the sphere of military effort, the Palestinian revolution could be inclined toward the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and certain friendly nations. But with diplomatic effort, it can be active in a direction which gains positions in countries opposed to it, such as the United States and certain European nations.

A similar problem remains regarding names, about which the following question could be raised: What is it that prevents the Palestinian revolutionary leaders from appearing with non-operational names?

Operational names such as Abu Jihad, Abu al-Latif, Abu al-Hasan, etc., were dictated by the circumstances of revolutionary military activity. But in this stage of diplomatic effort, it would not damage those leaders a bit to appear with normal names and not with operational names, especially since they as diplomats will not put the checkered kaffiyah on their heads, nor cartridges and pistol around their waists, nor will they carry a machinegun in their hands.

There is a basic mission before Palestinian diplomacy, and we believe that it is capable of it. It is to convince the elements of the revolution that the solution lies not only with the mouth of a rifle, but also with diplomatic flexibility from which communiques are not issued but only joint statements, press statements, and recognitions.

We say this on the basis that there is some tacit constraint prevailing over these elements, and a little explanation should enable Palestinian diplomacy to continue its efforts until victory.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO POLITICAL OFFICE CHIEF DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN QUESTION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 26 Oct 79 pp 28-29

[Interview with Abu Latif (Faruq al-Qaddumi), chief of the political office of the PLO, by Hadi al-Husayni in Paris, date not given]

[Text] Abu al-Latif (Faruq al Qaddumi), holds the post of Palestinian foreign minister, although his official title is chief of the political office in the Palestine Liberation Organization. He conducts himself on this basis, especially in his replies and the selection of his words. Abu al-Latif spent only 24 hours in Paris, while returning from Havana and the United Nations, enroute to Beirut or to "the nation" to use his term. However, he did not meet with a single French official, except at the United Nations, he did meet with the French foreign minister, Francois-Poncet, who told him that France was very interested in finding a solution for the Lebanese problem. Rather, he said that his French colleague insisted on telling him, during the meeting of the two in New York, that France was studying the adoption of decisive and prompt action to solve the Lebanese crisis.

AL-HAWADITH met Abu al-Latif in Paris and put some questions to him about the talk and speculation in diplomatic circles concerning the stages through which the Palestinians are passing in attaining their desire of a Palestinian state. This was the dialogue:

[Question] The Austrian chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, suggested recently that a confederated state between Palestine and Israel was the only solution to the Middle East question. Do you consider this a step backward by Kreisky from his previous positions?

[Answer] From the beginning we have stressed that we want an independent Palestinian state. Therefore this is not the problem. The problem is the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Palestinian and Arab land. This is what we think.

[Question] But the independent Palestinian state which you demand would inevitably be an open-border state with Israel!

[Answer] An independent state means that it has in fact the right to enact the laws and regulations it wishes. As long as it is independent, it has the right to do this, and those who run this state are responsible for its relations with all the other states.

[Question] There are those who demand a demilitarized Palestinian state, and some who say that Israel is afraid that this state would become a Soviet base. The American President Carter stated awhile ago that some of the Arab leaders do not want a Palestinian state.

[Answer] All the "words and speeches" said in the UN by the Arab nations stressed the necessity of establishing an independent Palestinian state. This refutes what President Carter said. Undoubtedly it is the right of such a state to have the army it wants.

As for it's becoming a Soviet base, the PLO is of the view, and there is absolutely nothing that would influence it, that we consider the Soviets as our friends, just as we consider non-aligned states, African states, and others.

[Question] There are contacts underway between Palestinians and Israeli officials: Moshe Dayan, the foreign minister, met with certain PLO supporters among the Palestinian personalities on the West Bank. Also it was reported that contacts took place abroad. What is the purpose of these contacts?

[Answer] We have no information regarding contacts underway between Israelis and Palestinians outside the borders of our occupied land. As regards internally, undoubtedly our people there are under occupation and are unable to say no. However, these contacts, according to the responses of the Palestinian brothers who undertook them, were clear and called for an independent Palestinian state, the right of self-determination, and rejection of the two Camp David agreements.

[Question] But a few days ago a meeting took place in Rome, during the "Peace in the Middle East" council, between PLO representative Dr Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani and the Israeli delegate Yuri Afniri?

[Answer] No "direct meeting" has occurred between PLO members and Israelis. I have no knowledge of it. In any case, such a meeting as this never happened. Al-Dajani has denied such contacts as these.

[Question] What has been the repercussions and effects on world public opinion from PLO head Abu 'Ammar's visits to certain European nations?

[Answer] Certainly they were positive political steps with regard to our relations with the European nations. They had a good effect in the international arena and in world political circles.

[Question] In your view, will France, the state, refuse to invite Abu 'Ammar to visit it?

[Answer] The case is not a case of rejection, but it is a question of time. When could such a meeting take place? This is the basis for that, and there is no other, especially rejection.

[Question] It was reported that the meeting of French President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing and Abu 'Ammar will take place in Kuwait during the French president's visit there?

[Answer] There is no objection to brother Abu 'Ammar and President d'Estaing meeting anywhere. This would be one of a series of meetings which we hold in several Arab countries whenever some Western friends visit Damascus or Kuwait or Saudi Arabia or Iraq or any other country.

[Question] But will Abu 'Ammar accede to the French Communist Party's invitation and visit France?

[Answer] He has not so far decided this question, but it has been accepted in principle. It has been left to time to make an appropriate decision.

[Question] Some say that if Abu 'Ammar complies with the French Communist Party's invitation, he will lose the support of a large part of French public opinion.

[Answer] Every man has an opinion regarding that, but as I said nothing has as yet been decided. This question is still under study.

[Question] Let's turn to Lebanon. The United States through its secretary of state is talking about the need to end the Lebanese problem. Also France. How do you see the Lebanese problem being solved?

[Answer] The solution to the Lebanese question will come firstly through Lebanese accord. There is no doubt also that it is up to the Arab states and all the Arab brothers to share in solving this bloody crisis. The coming Arab summit conference will discuss the Lebanese question, in addition to other cases.

[Question] Other cases, such as the Western Sahara issue for example?

[Answer] I don't know if the Sahara case is on the conference agenda or whether some of the nations will raise this issue.

[Question] Do you believe that it is possible to hold an Arab summit conference, or in the possibility of its success, especially since the bilateral disputes among the Arab nations are intensifying?

[Answer] It is true that Arab disputes are worsening and multiplying, but this is not the only time in which Arab disputes prevail. For many

years past there have been disputes such as these, and Arab summit conferences were held successfully to some degree.

[Question] Have you met with any French official this time?

[Answer] I am in France for only 24 hours on my way to Beirut. I have not met with any French official. However I did meet the French foreign minister, Francois-Poncet, in New York during the UN session. The basic conversation between us centered around the Lebanese problem and around the positive political developments which the Palestinian case has encountered.

[Question] Please clarify this further.

[Answer] The basic French views and concerns are aimed at the necessity of offering a specific and prompt initiative to solve the Lebanese crisis.

[Question] Will you cooperate with France in this regard?

[Answer] This means France is the basic element, then the Arab nations. We will help, within our capabilities, to offer the necessary assistance for that.

[Question] You stand at the side of the Iranian revolution. "Abu Jihad" sometime ago told AL-HAWADITH: "We will defend the Gulf oil." It is well known that the new regime in Iran has begun to threaten to "occupy" some of the Gulf states. How will you, as the PLO, arrange your positions so as not to damage one of the two parties?

[Answer] Ayatollah Khomeyni is the Iranian revolution's number one leader. He has not made any such statements as these in the past, but rather he has stressed at every opportunity his strong feelings that this gulf should be an Islamic gulf. We have not heard from him personally any statements about annexing some of the Arab portions to Iran. Without doubt, Khomeyni is the chief official and is the policy maker in Iran. He is the first and last authority, and we only rely on the words and statements of Ayatollah Khomeyni.

[Question] But, regarding the gulf, he insists on calling it Persian.

[Answer] On the contrary, he has called it the Islamic Gulf and is "opposed" to calling it the Persian Gulf. He did that in order to avoid crisis.

[Question] But his foreign minister, Ibrahim Yazdi, insists that the gulf is Persian.

[Answer] I have not heard that! I have met his foreign minister and heard no such thing from him.

[Question] Why have you not approved entering into mediation to put an end to the continuing war in Kurdistan, although it is said your relations with the Kurds are good?

[Answer] We do not interfere in the internal affairs of any country if it is a brother or a friend.

[Question] Are you still betting on the success of the Iranian revolution?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the Iranian revolution is a successful revolution, but it needs time to stabilize. All revolutions in the world have faced the same difficulties and obstacles.

[Question] How do you interpret the Soviet Union's recent position when Chairman Leonid Brezhnev announced, during his visit to East Germany, the withdrawal of 20,000 troops and 1000 tanks?

[Answer] It was an initiative on behalf of world peace and a lessening of tension in the world. No doubt the withdrawal of these forces from Europe will lessen the degree of tension in Europe itself.

Moreover, that will be reflected positively on Cuba, because the United States has escalated the crisis of Soviet forces in Cuba, knowing that these forces were there for years and are few in number.

In fact, after that, President Carter stated: "Let us forget the question of Soviet forces in Cuba."

[Question] What is your view of President Carter?

[Answer] If we were allowed to talk about Carter's policy, we would say that it is a vacillating policy. We gauge that with respect to ourselves. Frequently he has made statements and then changed them by other statements. He has taken stands and then changed them with baffling speed.

[Question] Do you think it is possible for him to be reelected?

[Answer] I don't know, but it is certain that there is a struggle within the United States among the Democrats themselves on the one hand, and between the Democrats and Republicans on the other. The coming months will show who will be the strongest candidate for the American presidency.

[Question] Has Abu 'Ammar's mediation between Morocco and Algeria failed?

[Answer] Abu 'Ammar has not undertaken any mediation between Algeria and Morocco. However, we were constantly ready, because we are mediators between any two "quarreling" Arab factions. In any case, I don't know whether there is mediation or not.

[Question] Everyone in Morocco says that it is private mediation, and that it came after Egypt announced giving military support to Morocco.

[Answer] President Sadat stated that he would offer arms to Morocco. This is all I know. However, I have no information as to whether Abu 'Ammar has undertaken any mediation between Algeria and Morocco.

[Question] What is the status of the investigation regarding the murder of Zuhayr Mohsen?

[Answer] It is still underway, but I have not been informed about it, because I have been away from "the nation" for more than 40 days, during which time I was in Havana and then New York.

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ALGERIA

AIT LAOUSSINE CALLS FOR REGULAR, PLANNED INCREASES IN OIL PRICES

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 5 Nov 79 pp 11, 12

[Text] Nordine Ait Laoussine, former Secretary-General of Algeria's state hydrocarbons group Sonatrach, has for several years been arguing the need for regular, planned increases in the price of oil. In its simplest form, the argument runs as follows: the alternative to planned price rises is to let the market dictate; this will mean a scramble for supplies every time there is a supply shortage, sudden and damaging jumps in price, followed by periods of glut during which the real price will decline. Sudden jumps in price hurt the consumer nations, while the erosion of their oil earnings hurts the exporters.

In a paper to the Vienna OPEC seminar, Mr Laoussine reviewed events over the past two years, since he last attended such a meeting and advocated an annual rise in oil prices of 5 per cent in real terms. "As you know, the market approach prevailed and won," he said. "The glut we created, purposely or inadvertently, did its job... That level of price which was laboriously set at Doha in December 1976 lasted in fact two years... At the end of 1978 the real price of oil, expressed in 1974 dollars, had been allowed to fall well below the \$7 per bbl floor price which the IEA itself claimed back in 1974 was the minimum level required to encourage the development of additional non-OPEC energy supplies."

The first effect was to incite the consumer nations to relax conservation efforts and the search for alternative energy sources. The second, Mr Laoussine implies, was that the consumers allowed stocks to dwindle, so that when the Iranian disruption began in late 1978, there was a scramble for supplies. "The combined effect of a severe winter, unusually low inventories and uncertainty over Iranian production sparked the upward price spiral." There was also the "inevitable temptation (for producers) to divert contract oil supplies onto the spot market and capitalise on higher prices. In less than six months, prices increased by 60 per cent. Looking at historical differentials, the real marker crude, assuming there is still one, is well above \$20 today."

The turmoil of the past year "is the result of the simple law of supply and demand," Mr Laoussine states. If the market is allowed to continue operating what he terms "this futile cycle of apparent surplus followed by supply crises," the result will be "an awkward series of falls and jumps (in price), always demonstrating the efficiency of the market system in responding, after the event, to a foreseeable problem."

The market, he asserts, "is nothing more than the expression of the balance of power between producers and consumers" at any given moment.

Authoritative sources have already predicted a glut for next year and it is not hard to see why. The 60 per cent rise in prices over a very short period will mean renewed conservation efforts and lower economic activity. This will of course dampen demand. Growth in demand between this year and next will be at most 2 per cent, Mr Laoussine predicts, bringing world demand to 65 million b/d; non-OPEC gas and oil production is likely to rise from 35 to 36 million b/d, leaving OPEC with a production share of about 29.5 million b/d.

Moreover, the consumer nations have virtually replenished their stocks and can start drawing on these early next year. OPEC, which is currently producing about 31 million b/d, would be able to cut output to about 27 million b/d by mid-1980, he states.

This is why it is important to exercise "production restraint," Mr Laoussine says. If market forces are allowed to operate, falling demand will first affect the producers of the higher-priced oils, setting in motion a price-slashing war. Producers can only be expected to cut output if their real earnings are protected, which is why the price of oil must at least be maintained in real terms after the end-of-year OPEC meeting in Caracas.

In conclusion, Mr Laoussine states that oil prices must be at least maintained in real terms, that price differentials must be realigned, OPEC must agree now to coordinate production restraint and the consumers must refrain from putting pressure on OPEC for a price freeze.

But, he goes on, these are merely the strategies to face up to a short-term problem. In the second half of his paper, Mr Laoussine discusses the requirements for a "smooth transition to the essentially coal-based economy of the 21st century."

His premises are, he says, uncontroversial: that the development of alternative energy sources implies long lead times and heavy investment; conventional crude prices are well below the replacement cost of other energy sources, and therefore oil prices will go on rising. Since economists agree that it is the speed of oil price rises, rather than their magnitude, which damages the economies of the consumer nations, a "common strategy" is needed for the transition period.

The first step, Mr Laoussine asserts, is to link price and production so as to eliminate the wide variations in OPEC output such as those experienced after 1974.

The second is to plan increases in the price of oil until it reaches the equivalent of that of replacement fuels. Mr Laoussine admits that it is very difficult to assess this level--he suggests \$30 a barrel in today's dollars for synthetic crude--but points out that the price will differ for the consumer and the producer.

"If OPEC countries are to justify to themselves a higher production rate than that required to balance national expenditures, they should be expected to receive its full replacement cost. The figure of \$30 a barrel I have quoted earlier only applies to developed, industrialised countries who have the technical, financial and human resources to manage these huge and complex projects. For the majority of OPEC countries, the real cost of replacing our oil reserves is going to be much higher."

A compromise must be reached between the lead times required to develop the alternative sources and the depletion of OPEC's resources. Here, Mr Laoussine suggests taking advantage of periods of high demand for crude to raise prices so as to remove the temptation for OPEC members to increase production.

Mr Laoussine concludes that a "common strategy" is necessary, because the oil producers "are as guilty as the consuming countries in dealing with world oil prices solely in terms of short-term political and economic expediency." OPEC, he goes on, "cannot just sit and react to external events such as inflation, currency depreciation and market conditions... (it) should lead rather than follow the historical process which will determine the shape of the oil market for the rest of the century."

CSO: 4420

IRAN

KHOMEYNI'S SON ENTERS EMBASSY, GIVES NEWS CONFERENCE

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Nov 79 p 12

/Article: "American Industries in Iran Which Have Not Been Nationalized Must Be"/

/Text/ At 1540 hours yesterday Hajj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni, the son of Emam Khomeyni, entered the American embassy compound and was received by the students. In their Proclamation No 9 Moslem student followers of the emam who had occupied the American embassy the previous Sunday invited Hojjatoleslam Ahmad Khomeyni to join the students in order to become informed about the state of affairs inside the embassy. Hajj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni accepted the invitation and entered the American embassy yesterday afternoon.

At first Hajj Ahmad Khomeyni was to enter the embassy site from the southern door, but was obliged to go in through the eastern door because of the extreme congestion of the crowd.

Inside the embassy, Hajj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni was received by the students and Hojjatoleslam Musavi Kho'eyni, who had been staying with the occupying students since the day before.

Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni participated in a press conference in the American embassy yesterday afternoon and said: "I came here by invitation of the brothers who follow the emam's policy but I have not yet held a discussion with them."

He was asked about the emam's message to the students and said "The emam declared his message in a meeting with the group which went to see him today." Concerning support for the students' measure of taking over the American embassy, Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni said "All the people of Iran support this act."

Asked if the emam had had any knowledge of Mr Bazargan's meeting with Brzezinski, Ahmad Khomeyni said "Not at all, and what the government spokesman has stated in this regard goes for Dr Yazdi's meeting with the emam."

Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni added, "I was also present at the minister of foreign affairs' meeting with the emam. Dr Yazdi just raised some matters concerning the indisposition of the deposed Shah but there was no talk about Bazargan's meeting with Brzezinski."

Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni refrained from expressing an opinion on the future of Bazargan's government. In answer to a question on whether American industries which have not been nationalized will be nationalized after the recent events, he said "Of course these industries must be nationalized."

He was asked whether he had any previous information on the students' step of taking over the American embassy in Tehran and said "No, not at all." Asked about the purpose of the trip by a high-ranking Iranian political delegation to Algeria, Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni replied "What is to be taken for granted is that the emam knew that the prime minister had been invited to Algeria to take part in the celebration of the anniversary of the beginning of that country's revolution and that Mr Bazargan would go to Algeria. Beyond this, the emam knew nothing."

Regarding Iran's relations with America, Ahmad Khomeyni said "If America's role in its relations with Iran resembled those the government of Austria has with Iran, what harm would there be in it?" He pointed out, "information has been received that agents from the CIA and the Mossad (the American and Israeli intelligence organizations) intend to take over other embassies, such as those of Syria and Britain, but I can stress that no other embassies must be occupied--not even the British one." Concerning the students' measure following the emam's policy, he said "In my opinion the students' measure is not to be considered one of occupying the American embassy; rather, our brave youths have taken over a nest of espionage in order to throw out the occupiers."

Ahmad Khomeyni was asked "Has Iran supported Palestine sufficiently" and said "The emam has defended Palestine 100 percent. The emam's support is so great that he has explicitly recommended that everyone must unite, join hands, extirpate Israel and replace it with Palestine. The other countries only mention this recommendation on Palestine as an organization when it is raised under certain conditions."

11337
CSO: 4906

IRAN

ESFAHAN PROSECUTOR ACCUSES ENGLISH HOSPITAL OF ESPIONAGE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Nov 79 p 1

/Article: "Declaration by Esfahan Revolutionary Islamic Public Prosecutor:
The English Hospital in Esfahan Was a Base for Western Espionage"/

/Text/ In publishing an announcement and listing the reasons for the expropriation of the Christian Hospital in Esfahan, known as the English Hospital, the Esfahan Revolutionary Islamic Public Prosecutor declared that this hospital had assumed the guise of the West's best espionage base.

In the Esfahan Revolutionary Islamic Public Prosecutor's statement, it was declared that: "On 31 October, after repeated warnings to hospital officials, the Esfahan Revolutionary Islamic Court held a meeting in absentia, and, with sufficient cause and documentation, expropriated the hospital and the movable and immovable assets connected to it."

A summary of the evidence the Esfahan Revolutionary Islamic Court presented is as follows:

"According to existing evidence and witnesses, the Christian Hospital was a nest of espionage for the benefit of foreigners against the masses of Iran. Supporting this view are sheet 17 of the file bearing on the hospital, concerning the use of bugging equipment and eavesdropping on telephone conversations, and sheet 48 of Esfahan Savak file number 4,327 stating that all hospitals and churches were used by the 'intelligence service.'

"2. The hospital was a center for training and a 'dissecting room' for inexperienced doctors and foreign students, more than a treatment center, and people very often lost their lives at the hands of these individuals. This is high treason and cannot be pardoned by any logic.

"3. Following the fall of the regime, the hospital's Iranian employees were not prepared to cooperate with the foreigners. For this reason a committee of guardians consisting of the representative of the Islamic Revolutionary Court, the Public Health Department, hospital employees, the office of the governor general and highly respected persons from the neighborhood took charge of administering the hospital's activities alongside the other employees.

"4. The hospital building, and other buildings connected to it, were constructed by Iranian individuals whose espionage and subservience have been irrefutably confirmed and established by existing documents, and the property of most of these people has been expropriated on behalf of the downtrodden. The murals and mosaics of the hospital support this view.

"5. Three and a half million tomans were received in aid from Public Health, and about the same amount from the municipality, the Oil Company, Dr Eqbal and Farah, for the construction of the new section. This aid shows the connection between the agents in charge of the hospital and the previous regime and it also establishes how they spent millions of tomans on a private institution while our poor masses had other fundamental needs. It also states the fact that the hospital was built through the budget of the downtrodden people of Iran.

"6. The activities of the agents in charge were not only contemptuous of Christ--on whom be God's peace--the hospital also developed into a center of anti-Islamic activities and was transformed into a base for the corruption of our Moslem youths.

"7. Bad supervision of the hospital resulted in huge sums being spent from the budget on poisonous anti-Islamic propaganda, the construction of unnecessary buildings and the purchase of luxury accessories for the personal use of hospital agents--not on the purchase of necessary equipment for outfitting the hospital."

The Esfahan Revolutionary Islamic Court's statement added "In the light of the above evidence, the former Christian and now Islamic Revolutionary Hospital, with all its movable and immovable assets, such as the Iran-tour Hotel and the Sons of Islamic Law lands, including the related housing and the rest, is being expropriated on behalf of the downtrodden, and its foreign staff, and the staff connected with foreign countries, are being removed. The board of trustees is charged with providing responsible, managerial persons who believe in the Islamic revolution to administer its affairs.

In this statement, with respect to hospital land, it was noted that "Since people received millions of rials from a non-profit organization, and spent large sums from the hospital workers' retirement fund, according to personal statements by Bishop Dehqani, the hospital land is also being expropriated."

In the concluding portion of the Esfahan Revolutionary Court's statement, it was said that "In honor of Christ (on whom be God's peace), who was one of the major prophets, the name of the hospital is being changed to Jesus son of Mary Hospital."

11837
CSO: 4906

IRAN

CURRENCY OF RUMORS AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS DEPLORED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 8 Nov 79 p 11

/Article by Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi: "So Say This Country Is Not Human!"

/Text/ You will find no individual in any class, group or society who doesn't have one or several big ["question marks"] or "buts" behind him in which some kind of attribution or charge is hidden.

Nowadays, until someone becomes involved in an action, he is a good man, a fighter, a holy warrior, a revolutionary, a Moslem, aware.

However, as soon as he becomes the source of the action, different types of arrows of accusation are fired against him, the "Savak" and "counter-revolutionary" files and documents on his "treason and sabotage" are brought out of hiding places, and people at least accuse him of inadequacy and incompetence in terms of the necessary qualities for undertaking the job which has been assigned to him, drawing up a "but" or several "buts" on everyone. Bazargan is a good man, devout, a combatant, plainspoken, "but" he lacks sharpness!

Qotbzadeh is sharp--"but" he is a tough man a dictator!

Dr Yazdi is a fighter but they say he has American tendencies!

Banisadr is a fighter and a thinker but he is "westernized" or, in some people's opinion, "easternized!"

Chamran is a brave man and a holy warrior but he has an unknown, mysterious face!

Madani is decisive and courageous but he is very stubborn and inflexible!

Beheshti has a thinking mind and he is a fighter, but he never went to prison or into exile!

Sadeq Tabataba'i is a fighter and is plainspoken but his mouth still gives off the odor of mother's milk!

The emam's son is frank and sincere and has always followed his father's course, but people say that he is friendly with some groups which are not on the emam's course! And so on.

Thus you will find no individual in any class, group or society who doesn't have one or several "buts" behind him in which some kind of attribution or charge is hidden.

In this context I have absolutely no concern with the personalities of the abovementioned persons or others; I do not want to defend anyone or, God forbid, accuse anyone.

I just want to open a small door here to a general principle and frankly express a danger which I feel with all my being is facing this revolution, since I see that this hurling of accusations does not involve one or two individuals but has, rather, developed a general aspect.

Is this particular situation a calculated plot by the enemy?

Do people with the aid of their agents want to exploit the special psychological state of our people, who have tormenting wounds from all the sources of their past experiences hidden within themselves, and immediately smear every personality who is a source of action in this country, whatever group or body he may be from (it makes no difference at all), sticking patches they had previously prepared onto him in order to prove that this country just has no substantial, blameless people at all, that one cannot find a worthy, useful man in it, that everyone has a toxin and a poison?

It is in this way that these people spread seeds of despair and pessimism in everyone's minds, causing everyone to lose hope for the future, through the same role they have carried out in other areas of the world, with completely effective results.

Or is this the special phenomenon of a society showing the lack of maturity of "a group" of us people who have not yet been able to grasp the fact that:

One, in these moments when the rumor-mills and the rumor market are overheated and the enemy is in this manner engaged in conspiracy, we must not allow him to succeed in reaching his goal by broadcasting and relying on various rumors.

Two, we should know that no one in the world is without faults or defects (except for prophets and the Innocent Ones) and that no one does not have thorns alongside the roses of his lofty qualities. What is important is that when grading-time comes, he should get a good grade, should not flunk and should not have a poor grade in any subject.

Three, with this situation we have found ourselves in, we are proving in the practical sense that this country has no one to administer its institutions, and, since that is the way it is, we are condemned to perish and must die, or can only survive by going back under the umbrella of the foreigners! What a painful matter this is.

Four, we are seeing today that as a result of these very issues--and others--terrible rifts have been created within the ranks of the revolutionaries, that every group is denouncing others, and that revolutionary Moslems in one town have even formed several groups and each one has a complaint about the others, presenting them as nonrevolutionary or even committing treason against the revolution or, considering that this is still the start of the job, do not realize what a great danger is threatening our revolution.

What a terrifying, heartrending situation this is.

In this situation, where are we going? Where? God knows.

11387
CSO: 4906

IRAN

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBER FORESEES END OF BIG LANDOWNERSHIP

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 10 Nov 79 p 11

[Interview with Ayatollah Dr Bahonar: "Big Landownership Will Come to an End in Iran"]

/Text/ Ayatollah Dr Bahonar, member of the Revolutionary Council, declared in an exclusive interview with ETTELA'AT's newsmen: "New projects in the field of agriculture will be presented." He stated "In the new Revolutionary Council project, land will be placed at the disposal of the farmers who work it." Dr Bahonar pointed out "Large landholdings will come to an end and farming and processing units will cease to be in the hands of big landholders: groups of farmers will manage these units."

This interview was held Thursday afternoon at the Council of Experts during an intermission in the council's discussions. The text of the interview is as follows:

/Question/ It has been said that some cabinet ministers of the temporary government are to be seen in the current makeup of the Revolutionary Council. Will these ministers also take part in the future composition of the council?

Dr Bahonar: The presence of ministers in the Revolutionary Council represented a special phase in the relationship between the Revolutionary Council and the government body. In reality, they were representatives of the government body in the Revolutionary Council and not official members of the Revolutionary Council. Therefore when the government body resigned, naturally their responsibility, which was that of representation in the Revolutionary Council, also came to an end.

Therefore the current makeup of the Revolutionary Council will include people who were members of the Revolutionary Council before the five people from the government body joined it; in any event, there will basically be a reshuffle in the current makeup of the Revolutionary Council. This reshuffle will be carried out concurrently with studies into the nature of degree of Revolutionary Council involvement in executive matters.

Breakdown of Revolutionary Council Members

/Question/ In its future composition, how many members will there be in the Revolutionary Council?

Dr Bahonar: The level under discussion is approximately the same 15 persons; however, that is not an absolute number and it could be increased.

Condition of Agricultural Lands

/Question/ In view of the fact that the temporary government has approved drafts in certain matters and some of these drafts have met with objections (for example, the land ownership bill was essentially drawn up contrary to the policy of the Islamic revolution of Iran), will the Revolutionary Council declare these drafts null and void, or will they be brought to the implementation stage after a review?

Dr Bahonar: Of course we will have new drafts in the field of agriculture. At the very beginning we were not able to provide a helpful review of all the drafts which had previously been presented, and one of the subjects in the agenda following this change of government status will be an examination of agricultural matters.

The goal is to have people who work on the land be the owners of the land and the possessors of the land--in fact, to have the major portion given to those farmers. Unused land also will be placed at the disposal of persons who can work directly on those lands and if capital should also be needed in order to revive these lands, this capital must be placed from the public budget at the disposal of farmers who themselves work on the land, as provided for.

Regarding large land ownership and extensive lands which are in the control of individuals, the council's goal and the orientation of its activity will be to manage gradually to place these lands at the disposal of the people who work on them. However, how this bill is to be drawn up, in terms of its stages of implementation, is something for which a bill must be prepared, in the light of available resources. However, the orientation of activity in the area of solving agricultural problems will be one where we will be able to place land at the disposal of persons who work on it.

Of course, since it is possible that it be difficult for isolated individuals acting independently to administer small plots, cooperatives will be formed so that people who do own small plots will be able jointly to create more extensive units and increase the possibilities for providing tools for production, tractors and the like and obtaining markets for the sale of their crops. Therefore it is possible that we may establish broad farming and processing units, in a form, however, whereby they will be not at the disposal of one farmer but at the disposal of a group of people, each of

whom is in fact the owner of a plot of land or at whose disposal that plot of land is. Of course this group will form a cooperative company together so that they can function better in managing it, raising its output level and improving the distribution situation.

Relations with the Superpowers

/Question/ In the new situation, how will relations with the imperialist countries develop? Will we cut off relations with those countries, the main one of which is America?

Dr Bahonar: Our action is based on the fact that the nature of our relationship with Western countries or any superpower must not be one of dominance and submission, but not be the relationship of a superpower to a condemned man. We do not intend to break relations. We do not want to isolate ourselves in the world--this is not essentially equitable and is not in keeping with any logic. Severing relations or isolating ourselves is not an option for us, unless the severing of powers or the severing of relations is relevant in some area, in which case we will have no choice but to cut off relations. The severance of relations has stages. A severance may be complete or it can be a cutoff of cultural or political or commercial relations--or the extent of the severance of relations can vary, or sometimes be a change and shift in the kind of relations, or a change in the type of relations.

What is important for us, though, is that our relations with other countries be equal and reciprocal, between two individuals neither of whom has the upper or lower hand in any way, in which neither will establish dominance in agreements or establish relations of master and servant. If this is the way it is, we can consider expanding our relations with many countries in various fields.

/Question/ Will the cabinet members remain in their positions?

Dr Bahonar: See, it is not a matter of having all ministers leave. Of course if a number of them are prepared to cooperate in the new plan, along with and in solidarity with the policy which governs the new conditions, they will remain in their positions. The sense of change in the situation does not entail the dismissal of all ministers and undersecretaries. It is possible for some of them who are prepared to cooperate and be in solidarity to be able to continue their jobs.

/Question/ Will the council elect these members?

Dr Bahonar: Yes, all the ministers have not resigned; that is, we are not now responsible for any of these individuals. It is very possible that we will, in the course of new elections among individuals, elect some of these persons who through their efficiency have been able to play a useful role in their working environment.

11887

CSO: 4906

IRAN

AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI ATTACKS IRAQI 'GENDARME POLICY'

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 3 Nov 79 pp 1, 8

[Excerpts] Yesterday, Ayatollah Montazeri, the official reciter of Tehran's Friday prayer ceremony, led hundred thousands wide awake Iranian believers, in crowded and orderly rows, on the lawn of Tehran University. The ceremony was attended by several ministers, religious, and government officials.

Ayatollah Montazeri delivered his first sermon by reading and interpreting Koranic Verses from the Chapter on "The Hypocrites." He said: "It is characteristic of Man to immediately thinking of abusing his power as soon as he achieves power or attains wealth. He who becomes a director or even a village headman immediately starts undergoing changes in thoughts, character, and ways of operating. And he also starts to treat people differently. But a real Man is who who does not lose his self-control and does not stop being himself, even after attaining wealth and power, and does not take sides partially, in his own self-interest or that of his associates.

That is possible when the individual involved is honest, virtuous, and irreproachable. In the "Nahjolbalagheh" ["Guidelines for Eloquence" title of a book on Enam 'Ali's sayings] Enam 'Ali states: "Authority and position are a testing ground for Man." Only when someone attains a position of authority and still treats people as before, may we say that that person is a virtuous, honest, and irreproachable human being. However, there have been honest, religious, and virtuous persons in history who, although famous, set out to exercise oppression and tyranny, and slay people like executioners upon achieving power.

People Should Be Treated Impartially

You who have achieved power and high office, please treat people impartially and always respect people's rights. Never take advantage of your power and position of trust to impose oppression. Never be self-seeking or commit

atrocities. He who is a minister, governor, or religious judge, or other high official, should not act as in the past. In the event such an official has been entrusted with people's treasury, he should not misappropriate or embezzle people's funds. There should be no connivance or collusions. He who has become a governor should not treat the province under his jurisdiction as a fief and do as he please. He should be a reliable person who will safeguard people's trust judiciously. I hereby call upon all those who occupy positions of power, such as religious leaders, ministers, lawyers, and other officials in Iran or abroad, not to take advantage of their positions or rank. Such officials must defend what is right, find out what is right, and act accordingly. They must refrain from connivance and any thought of abusing their positions or rank. They must act like Enam 'Ali [son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad and first Caliph of the Shiites], consider other people as their brothers, and prosecute/sentence their brother if the latter violates the law. And not set him free and exempt him from prosecution just because he happens to be their brother. Please recall how Enam 'Ali treated his brother 'Aqil when 'Ali was in power and entrusted with the Moslems' treasury. 'Ali guarded the treasury judiciously and refused to give 'Aqil an iota more than what he gave to others.

You who guard the people's treasury in ministries or the army, please bear in mind that this is a position of trust bestowed upon you by the Lord and the nation and that you should strive to safeguard it. If you do not change your style and continue as in the past, you will have to deal with the young people who have shed their blood to carry out the Revolution, and who are still alive. If you are not going to change the prevailing wasteful practices, you will have to deal with the same dedicated and virtuous young Moslems. Offices must be straightened out. This is a candid and straightforward reminder addressed to both military and religious officials: everybody must respect and safeguard the nation's rights. You, directors and directors general must not practice nepotism in your offices. Please eliminate past wastefulness and uphold people's rights. If your brother or son has committed a crime, prosecute him and never attempt to take advantage of your position or rank to block prosecution or to acquit him. If you are a follower of 'Ali, act like 'Ali; if you believe in 'Umar [the Caliph 'Umar, second successor of the Prophet Mohammad], then follow the path of 'Umar.

Many Unfinished Tasks

We must bring about sweeping changes in our lifetime. We have engineered a Revolution, we have thrown out the shah. This is fine and dandy, but the Revolution does not consist merely in throwing out the shah: many other tasks remain unfinished. Please change your manner of operating, we must set out to change our modus operandi. Coercion must cease. Connivance, collusions, and nepotism must become things of the past. Superfluous expenses and wastefulness by employees must be cut, and we must set out to streamline and overhaul tasks, programs, and modes of living.

This is a friendly reminder which we are giving to all strata and groups of the population, to all those who occupy positions of trust and power. I have another message for Moslems in Islamic countries and those living outside Iran.

Moslems of the world, wake up! See how the united Iranian people has deposed the Satan of our times and done away with a 2,500 years old monarchical rule. Sacrifice yourself for Islam. Satanic forces can no longer rule over you.

You, rulers of Islamic countries, I hereby call upon you to emulate the new regime in Iran: come, take refuge in Islam's bosom. Do not practice oppression, injustice, and despotism. Please bear in mind that SAVAK was much more powerful than the security agents of Iraq and those of other countries in destroying books, magazines, pictures, and the like. Nevertheless, singlehandedly, the Iranian nation overpowered SAVAK. Under the deposed shah many persons were put behind bars for years for tearing pictures and leaflets. Please do not commit atrocities.

We have received word that a certain number of our Iraqi Moslem brethren have been executed. Mohammad Reza's role in Iran is now being replayed by Iraq's leader. He is acting like the "gendarme of the Middle East." He is plotting against Iran. His ambassador in Beirut has issued a statement against Iran. Traces of Iraqi conspiracies have been uncovered in Kordestan and Khuzestan showing Iraqi complicity in providing arms and other assistance against the Iranian Revolution. You, Sir, who are ruling over Iraq, relinquish some of the power you are wielding: the Iraqi nation is also Moslem. How much longer do you think your Moslem nation would put up with you? Go and make it up with your nation. After all, you are no stronger than Mohammad Reza, the Satan. None of the Islamic countries was as strong as Mohammad Reza. This is not the way to wield power. The path adopted by Mohammad Reza failed and will fail again. As Enam Khomeyni has advised, you should make it up with Islam. Expend Iraq's revenue on the Iraqi nation and Islam. Do not take advantage of your position. I am advising you hereby as a Moslem. Counseling and directing to do what is good/lawful and enjoining not to commit what is unlawful/wicked are among the duties of every devout and committed Moslem.

Self-Sufficiency in All Fields

At the outset of his second sermon in yesterday's prayer, Ayatollah Montazeri touched upon the issue of agriculture and achieving self-sufficiency in Iran's agriculture and other sectors, saying: please keep in mind that we have engineered a Revolution and have overthrown Satan, but those who have plundered our resources for a lifetime have now embarked upon plotting against us. Every day and every hour, in some corner of Iran, a new conspiracy is being instigated: bloody events in Kordestan, terrorizing the ulena, etc. are some of these conspiracies carried out by Iran's enemies. All this points to the fact that they wish to shatter our Revolution by stirring up dissensions within the Shiite Branch of Islam, between Arab Iranians and Persian Iranians.

If you wish to be immune from the enemies, then Iran's self-sufficiency is paramount. When Iran achieves self-sufficiency in all sectors, when Iran stops being an exclusively consumer country, then we can be immune to the shackles of the enemy and live quite freely and comfortably. The colonialist policy of the shah's regime consisted in transforming Iran into a consumer country by importing rice and wheat from the United States, meat from Australia, and other items from other countries. That was a mistaken and anti-people's policy which was conducted contrary to Iran's potential. The energy minister under the former shah stated that out of the 100 Iranian water resources areas, only 17 were being used, while the rest was being wasted. We can build dams and, with appropriate techniques, prevent the wastage of rivers' water. The nation and the government must work hand in hand. Yesterday, at the program of 'Eyd-e Qorban [Feast of Sacrifices], I exhorted students not to neglect their studies. It's O.K. to chant your slogans, but do your home assignments, too!

Students, we need your energies to achieve self-sufficiency in terms of manpower. Your task is to study in order to become trail blazers and researchers. Unfortunately, every day, classes are being closed and students leave their schools without cause. This must stop.

13 Aban [4 November] coincides with the anniversary of the attack on Tehran University by the troops of the previous regime and the slaughter of at least 50 students. The same day coincides with the banishment of the leader of the Revolution, Esmat Khomeyni, to Turkey. We are now gathered on the lawn of Tehran University to commemorate that day. There is no longer any reason to close your classes and deprive yourself of lessons, research, and study.

Farmers must work harder and strive to develop lands. Farmers! Do not wage wars in vain over land. Instead, engage in land cultivation. Whoever engages in land reclamation will be entitled to own that land. Nobody has the right of seizing the desert, God's land, which a Moslem has reclaimed. If a land is uncultivated and nobody has reclaimed it, go and reclaim it. Nobody has the right to protest such an action. If someone does protest that the land being reclaimed by somebody has already been registered by the dad of somebody else, then that dad had been wrong: if you cultivate a barren land nobody else will be permitted to confiscate even an iota of it. The more barren land you cultivate, the more benefits you will derive. Make barren land available to others so that they may cultivate it. You who have registered the people's lands, return them to people. Enrich the country. Work hard and develop agriculture. This is the duty of an Islamic government to pay greater attention to farmers and grant them larger subsidies. A considerable effort must be exerted to develop animal husbandry and agriculture. If we have to use oil income to import meat and wheat from Australia, we can eat meat no more than twice a week and save the cost of imported items to develop animal husbandry.

Yesterday's prayer ceremony closed with the chanting of slogans against America

and imperialism, and the commemoration of martyrs of the past few days in Sardasht. At the program's close participants listened to the report of a revolutionary guard and a message from Emam Khomeyni on the occasion of 13 Aban [4 November], and then left the lawn of Tehran University.

8291
CSO: 4906

IRAQ

FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES IRAQ'S POLICY

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 21 Oct 79 pp 3,7

[Interview with Iraqi Foreign Minister Sa'dun Hammadi, date and place not given]

[Text] In this interview, Foreign Minister Dr Sa'dun Hammadi talks about the main Arab and international issues at present, and presents a comprehensive and clear picture of the dimensions, horizons and meanings of the foreign policy followed by the 17-30 July Revolution on both the Arab and international planes --a policy whose principles, values and bases are derived from the program and principles of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party.

[Question] How do you view the relationship between the current session of the United Nations and the Sixth Nonaligned Summit Conference which met in Havana on 3 September?

[Answer] The Havana conference confirmed the main principles of the nonalignment movement. These include, first of all, that the nonalignment movement is a movement which stresses independence in foreign policy--the exact meaning of independence being independence from all foreign influences. Another of the movement's principles is that it is a progressive movement, which means that it has a position vis-a-vis the international currents and social and political systems which exist in the world. In addition, the movement is hostile to imperialism in all its forms--both the old colonialist imperialism and the new imperialism based on economic exploitation by indirect means.

The nonalignment movement is diametrically opposed to Zionism, the racist regimes in Africa and all forms of racial discrimination. All of these principles are now reflected in the positions of the Third World states on the issues submitted before the current session of the United Nations. Of course, this does not mean that all of the Third World states have a

completely unified position on these issues, but generally speaking and on the whole these states take a stand along those lines. For the United Nations is no longer an organization controlled by the Big Powers as was the case in the past. And when I speak of the role of the Third World states and the role of the nonaligned states, I mean, to be exact, their role in the General Assembly and not in the Security Council, for well-known reasons.

Specifically, the sixth conference of the Nonaligned Summit condemned in no uncertain terms the Camp David agreements and the Zionist-Sadat accords. It also condemned the Sadat regime and put the membership of this regime in a doubtful position in the movement. I noted that the effect of this important decision was felt in the other states of the world which do not belong to the movement. By an initiative from the Arab bloc, the nonaligned states are now preparing a draft resolution to condemn the Camp David agreements on these bases and is urging the General Assembly to vote for it.

[Question] How are the nonaligned states working to put the Havana conference resolutions into effect?

[Answer] After issuing the important document in Havana, the nonaligned states are now working through the UN General Assembly and the committees which spring from it to present resolutions which are in keeping with the Havana conference decisions on the main political problems and the other economic and social problems. The nonaligned bloc forms a large segment of the Third World states and an important percentage of UN members. The bloc held a meeting in New York in which it studied the most important issues, and it reached agreement that its action would be unified and directed toward implementation of the Havana summit resolutions. This activity will not be restricted to the current session of the General Assembly, but will extend over a longer range than the present year and will be reflected in all the other activities of the United Nations, including the activities of its specialized organizations.

[Question] What are the most important matters which are drawing attention in the current session of the United Nations?

[Answer] First of all, one thing which must attract attention is the fact that the resolution of condemnation of the Camp David agreements has received a significant and wide response from the European bloc--by which I mean the bloc of Common Market states. It seems to me that the bloc of European states has now become convinced that the greater part of public opinion in the Third World opposes the Camp David agreements, and that opposition is no longer limited to the Arab countries and the Islamic states.

Another thing is that Pope John Paul II's speech in the United Nations did not touch on any specific issues except the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, Zionist aggressions against South Lebanon and the issue of

Jerusalem. This fact indicates that the Vatican, as well, has been influenced by the largescale opposition which the Zionist entity is encountering in the world, as reflected in opposition to the Camp David agreements.

The third thing is that economic affairs have begun to occupy an important place in UN deliberations. Thus, the 77 states held a meeting at the United Nations during the session. The majority of the delegations' remarks reflected the economic crisis which the Third World is undergoing because of the inflation exported by the industrialized states, and the economic and financial troubles which the capitalist industrialized states are causing for the Third World states.

There is a widespread conviction of the need to resume the Paris conference negotiations and begin a world dialogue on economic affairs within the framework of the United Nations in order to implement the decisions of the international organization's two special sessions on economic problems.

[Question] Do you believe that there has been development in the position of the Common Market states on Arab issues?

[Answer] Yes, I do believe that there has been development in the position of the European bloc states. The reasons for this development are a combination of various factors, including an awareness of the importance of the Arab homeland economically, the relative potential for Arab views to create a united front in the wake of the Baghdad summit conference, and the Europeans' sense of the importance of independence from the Big Powers in foreign policy.

Naturally, this development is not alike in all the states nor is it clearly defined, but rather it is relative and dissimilar. This development is reflected in the official statements of a number of officials of the European bloc states.

We in Iraq, of course, welcome and encourage this development, and we offer everything required to help further it within the limits of our capabilities.

Numerous other Third World states have also observed this development, and the Zionist entity and Sadat's regime are not pleased with it.

[Question] What is the truth about the American plan to hold a conference to deal with the situation in South Lebanon?

[Answer] This plan has not been announced. We heard about it indirectly. American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made it known to some Arab delegations which met with him.

The idea appears to be half conceptual. But in general it originates from an evil intention which ultimately can only serve American political purposes and Zionist aims.

[Question] Do you have a comment on the economic matters in the current session of the UN General Assembly?

[Answer] Iraq's position on economic issues has become clear. But some comments must be made on the attempts currently underway to force the oil-producing states to begin a dialogue with the capitalist industrialized states on the subject of energy for the sake of solving the industrialized states' problems and insuring their needs.

For the most part, this goal is cloaked in glowing words and appeals to the non-oil-producing developing states aimed at winning them over. One thing which is regrettable is that some of the Third World states may be responding to such attempts, and some have already done so.

The speech made by Mexico's president at the United Nations needs to be studied and analyzed. Whatever the purposes of this speech were, we still believe that the welfare of the developing nations lies in their initiating a comprehensive international dialogue on all the economic problems, not just on the energy issue. One thing that should be pointed out is that new initiatives are being brought out at the same time that the Paris conference has come to a halt and the industrialized states have tacitly rejected the UN resolutions in the two special sessions I mentioned previously.

We have already expressed our dissatisfaction with Mexico's proposals in this regard, for ultimately they do not serve the interests of the developing states, regardless of the intentions.

[Question] How do you view the pope's visit to the United Nations, and how do you assess the speech which he delivered before the General Assembly?

[Answer] In general, the pope's speech at the United Nations was positive. I was pleased that he mentioned the rights of the Palestinian Arab people explicitly and dealt indirectly with what the Zionist entity is doing in the Arab region. Another thing that pleased me in the speech was the clear discussion of the difference between the rich and the poor, which is now the conspicuous phenomenon in the capitalist world. Naturally, the impact of the Vatican is a spiritual one, but it is an impact which should not be underestimated.

[Question] What is the role of the Arab bloc in this session, and how does the Arab bloc coordinate its positions?

[Answer] As in previous sessions and international conferences, the Arab bloc is acting in a well-coordinated manner by holding a meeting of the entire Arab bloc at the ministerial level and adopting clearly defined positions on the main issues, but not on the secondary or controversial issues.

This is the secret of the success which the Arab bloc achieved at the Nonaligned Summit Conference in Colombo, the movement's foreign ministers' conference in Belgrade and the Havana summit conference. By this I mean its success in concentrating on the main issues instead of the secondary issues, and on the noncontroversial issues instead of the controversial issues. The most important of these issues is the Arab-Zionist struggle.

This year, Iraq called for this meeting to be held, and there was unanimous agreement that a resolution condemning the Camp David agreements similar to the resolution adopted in Havana will be presented in the current session.

A working committee for drafting, making contacts and directing activity was formed, with Iraq as one of the members, and this committee is continuing with its work. In addition, the Arab delegations are allotting assignments pertaining to making contacts with the delegations of other states. Each delegation or group of delegations undertakes to contact a number of delegations from the other states according to the quality of its relations.

[Question] What is Iraq's role in joint Arab action during this session?

[Answer] Iraq's role is as I said: It called for this meeting, submitted the draft resolution as a concept, conferred with the other Arab delegations active in this area and reached agreement with them on the tactics necessary for the resolution to succeed. It also performed its obligations with regard to contacting the other states.

This is not all. Iraq made many more contacts than it was assigned, and our delegation has clear instructions to cooperate within the working committee. I believe that Iraq has a great burden in this area, and we accept the fact that we carry the biggest responsibilities based on our national responsibility.

[Question] How do you view Arab-African relations following the Havana summit conference?

[Answer] At the Havana conference, it became clear to us that despite past efforts which have been made to strengthen Arab-African relations, we are still lacking in this area--lacking in the area of forming a web of bilateral and collective relations with the African states--and I mean

economically, politically, culturally and socially--and lacking also in our understanding of African thinking. For instance, there were some African leaders whose positions we would hear about indirectly, whereas we listened to these leaders directly at the Havana conference. There was a big difference between the two cases.

I am happy to say that we were given an opportunity at the Havana conference to become familiar with the views of the African leaders. I, personally, went out from the Havana conference convinced that there is ample opportunity to strengthen cooperation between the Arab countries and the African states, and between Iraq and a great number of these states. To be specific, I can say that in this conference our relations were strengthened and we became better acquainted than before with the leaders of Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania, to name some examples.

[Question] How does the Iraqi delegation act during the General Assembly session?

[Answer] The Iraqi delegation acts on the basis that it is represented in all the committees, is present at General Assembly debates, cooperates with the Arab delegations, is in continuous contact with the active delegations of the nonaligned states and that it has specific and general duties. The specific duties are the draft resolutions which Iraq wants presented in the current session, the most important of which is the resolution I mentioned earlier concerning condemnation of the Camp David agreements. The general duties include taking well-defined positions on the detailed items on the agenda, that is, the matters usually discussed each year.

The Iraqi delegation also prepares more than one report on the session it attends.

[Question] What are the most important contacts which you have made during the current session?

[Answer] Every year, we use the convening of the session as an opportunity to make a large number of contacts. By this I mean meeting with the foreign ministers who are in New York at this time.

These contacts are of two kinds. First, the kind that we request, and these are planned prior to the convening of the session in accordance with Iraq's concerns. The second kind is in response to requests for meetings which we receive from others. This year, we gave the matter of contacting foreign ministers of the African states special importance, since we met with a large number of African foreign ministers, as well as the secretary general of the United Nations.

As for meetings with foreign ministers of the Arab countries, they occur almost on a daily basis. In these meetings, we usually discuss bilateral

relations, the Arab issues for which we want to obtain the support of the state concerned, and anything else that either side wants to discuss.

We must also mention the meetings which are held by the blocs, such as the Arab bloc, the 77 bloc, the bloc of nonaligned states, the bloc of Islamic states and so on.

[Question] Do you have something to say about the speech methodology of Iraq before the General Assembly?

[Answer] Since I began attending meetings of the General Assembly, I have observed that a large number of states follow the traditional methodology in writing their speeches. This methodology is based on defining the state's positions on all the international issues one by one.

Because most international issues do not change substantially and unexpectedly from year to year, speeches based on the traditional methodology are semi-routine and repetitious. Moreover, such a methodology has a tendency to mix up the important matters with the unimportant matters. For this reason, we have for several years followed a somewhat different methodology based on concentrating only on the main issues. Positions on the other international issues are stated by Iraq's representatives in the various committees.

This year, the main issue in Iraq's speech was a clarification of the dangers of the Camp David agreements.

[Question] During the last period, the subject of the Gulf-European dialogue was raised. What is our position in Iraq on this plan, and what is our position on Arab-European dialogue in general?

[Answer] We are in favor of any rapprochement between any two Arab countries or within any group of Arab countries, but we do not feel that it is proper to establish long-term Arab blocs because this tends to create bloc-oriented feelings among other Arab sides, and bloc-oriented feelings are usually negative feelings toward Arab unity.

We feel that dialogue must take place between the Arab countries and the European states. If I wanted the dialogue to center around the subject of energy, still it must not be confined to the Arab countries overlooking the Persian Gulf, because there are other Arab oil-producing states which must participate in this dialogue.

With regard to the Arab-European dialogue, as is generally known we support this dialogue and believe that it should be both economic and political at the same time, and a long-range dialogue rather than one restricted to an unusual period of time.

These views did not receive a total response from all the European states at first--I mean the ideas that the dialogue should be both

political and economic and long-range rather than short-range.

These ideas were not completely accepted by the European states in the beginning, but a development has been noted recently, which is that these ideas have begun to be accepted more than in the past. This is a positive development which we welcome.

[Question] What is Iraq's position on international alliance and blocs, and how do you view the American, Omani and Iranian moves in the Persian Gulf?

[Answer] Iraq's position on international alliances is clear. We are against alliances and blocs of any kind. I would be very glad to see a world in which all alliances were dissolved. With regard to the moves in the Persian Gulf area, the United States and the colonialist states have been trying for a long time to force the states overlooking the Gulf to create some sort of alliance to protect the oil interests of the colonialist states.

We regret to say that the government of Oman has always been the initiator in proposing these ideas on behalf of its original masters.

This occurred during the days of the shah when the issue of Gulf security was raised and the Muscat conference was held concerning it.

The position of Iraq was the main factor in thwarting this attempt. Now the Omani government is again proposing the same ideas in an indirect technical manner by calling for the creation of a system of control over the sealanes.

The United States is now working openly on the military preparations necessary for military intervention in this area, as is indicated by a succession of official statements. The policy of the shah was based on hegemony over this area, and we wished countless times that this policy would be eliminated after the new situation arose in Iran. However, it is clear that this has not occurred as of yet, and this is regrettable.

The Arab countries will resist the policy of hegemony from whatever direction it comes. It should be pointed out that Iraq's foreign policy does not just spring from the welfare of Iraq as a country, but from the Arab welfare--especially where the security of Arab territory and the Arab character of the Arab countries are concerned. Every Arab issue is an issue which concerns Iraq, and this is something we want Iran to understand in its new era.

[Question] As the appointed date for the convening of the Tenth Arab Summit Conference in November approaches, what do you see as the most important matters which will be placed on the conference agenda; and will the conference be prompted to reexamine the minimum resolutions reached at the Baghdad conference to confront the Camp David agreements?

[Answer] I do not believe that anyone is considering asking for a reexamination or reconsideration of the minimum which was approved at the

Baghdad summit conference and the previous Arab summits.

We believe that the real task for the coming summit conference is to concentrate its attention on the Arab internal situation, not on the foreign relations and matters which lie outside the Arab homeland. By this I mean that attention should be centered on the means of increasing Arab autonomous power and on nothing else. What I mean by Arab autonomous power is political power--including relations with others--economic power, and military power. For to the extent that Arab autonomous power increases, the power of the Arabs vis-a-vis the enemy will increase, and we will draw nearer to the proper solution to the problem of the Arab-Zionist struggle.

We must not dream, and we must not be deluded, for it is impossible for the Zionist enemy to agree to Arab claims unless it is forced to do so.

There is ample opportunity to work on strengthening Arab autonomous power now, but talk about what international public opinion will accept or not accept is conceptual talk and a waste of effort. Political action is important, but only when autonomous power is abundant.

8591
CSO: 4802

MOROCCO

STUDENTS RELEASE COMMUNIQUE PROTESTING AGGRESSION, EXPULSIONS

Casablanca AL-MUHARRIR in Arabic 20 Oct 79 pp 1,3

[Article: "In a Communique By the Executive Committee of the National Union of Moroccan Students: the National Union of Moroccan Students Thinks that the Time Has Come to Begin a People's War of Liberation Which Will Put an End to the Recurring Aggression Against Our National Territory; It Calls For the Immediate Annulment of All Illegal Expulsion Decisions Taken Against Hundreds of Students"]

[Text] The executive committee of the National Union of Moroccan Students [UNEM] has released the following communique:

The nation is witnessing grave developments on all levels, and particularly in the matter of our territorial integrity and the challenges that have made our land a theater for repeated assaults that have recently taken the form of open war which is being waged by mercenaries armed with the latest weapons. This confirms the feebleness of the "liberation movement" claim being propagated by Algerian propaganda. These assaults have been resolutely resisted by our steadfast armed forces. If the UNEM is in harmony with the position of the popular masses and their progressive forces, and in keeping with the directive of the 16th National Congress it is believed, more than ever, require the mobilization of the popular masses to plunge into a people's war of liberation to put an end to the recurrent aggression against our territorial integrity. Officials in this country contrary to the will of the masses have not ceased to take a number of radical measures which create difficulties for the popular masses in general and for students in particular, which by their nature are harmful to the atmosphere of the mobilization which is required.

Within this framework, the measures which have been taken by the country's rulers--and particularly the officials in higher education--at the beginning of this year have done nothing but aggravate the educational situation by concocting numerous problems which are manifested in the decisions of collective expulsion taken against hundreds of students and hinting at the intention to retreat on the principle of general distribution of the stipends instead of increasing their amount, and shutting the door to higher education in the face of persons who hold the baccalaureate.

Believing that poor university admission must lead to a poor academic year, the UNEM puts on the officials the burden of the results of the measures they have taken during this university admission. At the same time it considers itself duty-bound to bring to the attention of national public opinion these measures which have been taken by the officials to obstruct the normal progress of the academic year. Among all these measures which have been taken are the following:

The wave of expulsions which this year has touched all the higher institutes in addition to the faculties in a way unprecedented in the history of higher education in our country. Hundreds of students have thus been expelled [from the following schools]:

The Hasan II Institute of Agriculture and Veterinary Science

The National School of Farming in Meknes

The National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics

The Mohammedia School of Engineering

The National School of Metal Work

The Preparatory Year In Higher Agricultural Studies

The medical faculties and the Faculty of Science in Rabat.

The expulsion decisions have included all levels from the first year to the third and fourth year and even the sixth and final year. This is considered a loss to the efforts of the masses who alone pay for the cost of training. Does it make sense for the expulsion decisions to include hundreds of students in technical and scientific fields of specialization--among them some who are about to graduate--while our country suffers a gap in the number of the technical and scientific cadres necessary, inasmuch as our country does not have more than 600 scientists and engineers for each million inhabitants? This is a very poor ratio even in comparison with the minimum determined by the Arab Scientific and Technological Conference in 1976 and calling for the obtaining of 2,000 scientists and engineers for each 1 million inhabitants, and at a time when the nation's needs demand increasing the capacity of the technical institutions to accommodate 3,000 engineers each year. Do we need more than this to demonstrate the extent of the inconsistency of the expulsion decisions which have been taken and the statements which assert Morocco's need for technical cadres?

Within the same framework the expulsion measures have also included large numbers of medical students while we are desperately in need of one doctor for every 3,000 citizens instead of one for every 13,000 currently.

The officials have not been content to expel hundreds of students at the beginning of this school year, but have proceeded to put a number of new

obstacles in the way of the students. This has led to a large number of holders of the baccalaureate remaining without a seat in higher education despite official statements and commitments. A 1979 baccalaureate has been made a prerequisite, the "registration period" has been limited, and a competitive system has been imposed in the school of medicine. All of these measures are obstacles for the purpose of solving the problem of equipping and preparing the cadres at the expense of the children of the popular masses who with great effort have obtained the baccalaureate.

While persisting in aggravating the educational situation the officials have begun on every occasion to hint at an open about-face on the principle of making stipends universally available, and there has been talk about imposing "new standards" for obtaining a stipend. This is happening while the popular masses are urgently requesting an increase in the amount of the stipend which has become insufficient in the face of the frightful increase in the cost of living because the overwhelming majority of the popular masses come from economically deprived classes and bear the responsibility for their families' material needs, in addition to rent prices, which rose by 300 percent between 1974 and 1977 only and which consume more than 50 percent of the student's stipend.

In the face of the gravity of the situation to which higher education has come and the challenges which are aimed at destroying the gains made together by the student and mass movement the executive committee of the UNEM calls attention to the communique issued by the administrative board in its first regular session on 19 September 1979 which was followed by a number of contacts at all levels, and it congratulates the student masses on the gains that had [previously] been taken away--the reopening of registration in the Faculty of Arts in Rabat, the Muhammad I University in Cujda, the Qadi 'Iyad in Marrakech and the law school in Casablanca, and the ordering of the rescission of the 1979 baccalaureate prerequisite which was being applied by the officials without any legal basis. It also calls for increased mobilization and unity in the ranks to confront the challenges surrounding the student movement, and preserving their gains chief among which is the right of every student to obtain a stipend and an increase in its amount to satisfy the students' needs.

The UNEM executive committee calls to the attention of student and national public opinion the gravity of the higher education situation as a result of the measures and decisions taken by the officials since the beginning of the year. It places full responsibility on officials in the government apparatus which considers education expenses a heavy burden while the popular masses must pay them.

It demands the follow: 1. The immediate annulment of all the illegal expulsion decisions taken against hundreds of students in the Faculty of Science, the School of Medicine, the Hasan II Institute For Agriculture and Veterinary Science, the National Institute for Statistics and Applied Economics, the National School for Farming in Meknes, the School of Metals, the Mohammedia School of Engineering and the other institutions.

2. Registration of all students, who hold the baccalaureate, in [institutions of] higher education.

The executive committee emphasizes the readiness of the student masses to engage in serious and responsible dialogue. It announces the recruitment of all students to defend these urgent demands and to be ever ready to confront all projects which seek to destroy the gains of the student and people's movement, foremost among which is the right to education and a stipend.

The executive committee of the UNEM 18 October 1979.

9123

CSO: 4402

MOROCCO

ARREST CAMPAIGN AGAINST USFP ACTIVISTS IN ALGERIA DENOUNCED

Casablanca AL-MUHARRIR in Arabic 24 Oct 79 pp 1,8

[Article: "Arrest Campaign Against the USFP Activists In Algeria"]

[Text] We have learned that the Algerian authorities have begun a broad arrest campaign against USFP activists who live in Algeria in order to pressure them into adopting a position hostile to our people's struggle for its territorial integrity.

Brothers, Ibrahim Kamal and Mustafa al-'Ammari, who have lived in Algeria since 1963, have been arrested. They have been detained in the offices of the Algerian military intelligence without any clear charge other than that they refused, and still refuse, to support the separatist tribalist theses being defended by the Algerian authorities under the cover of the right to self-determination of our Saharan territories. It is well known that the activists Ibrahim Kamal and Mustafa al-'Ammari are the activists from Figuig who know very well how, shortly before independence, vast areas were detached from Moroccan territory. It is also well known that brothers Ibrahim Kamal and Mustafa al-'Ammari were among the senior editors of the newspaper LIBERATION.

If arrests such as these confirm the patriotism and steadfastness of Moroccan political exiles in the face of all kinds of pressure and temptation, we take this opportunity to report that for years the popular masses have not ceased demanding the pardoning of political exiles so that they may participate with the rest of their brethren in establishing the principles of democracy and, the truth, and in the fulfillment of territorial integrity.

9123
CSO: 4402

WESTERN SAHARA

INTERVIEW WITH POLISARIO'S NUR-AL-DIN AHMAD 'ALI

Military Situation

- Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 10 Oct 79 pp 6-7

- [Interview with Nur-al-Din Ahmad 'Ali, political bureau member and foreign relations official of the POLISARIO, by Ahmad 'Ayyash; date and place not given]

[Text] "POLISARIO," the Western Sahara Liberation Front, has begun a campaign in the Arab world to clarify its political position with regard to the latest developments in the Sahara region. While it is undertaking this campaign, its revolutionaries are continuing their heroic actions against the Moroccan regime and inflicting upon them huge losses in men and equipment. The latest of these heroic actions was the liberation of the city Semara, the second largest city in Western Sahara. AL-NIDA' met Nur-al-Din Ahmad, member of the political bureau and head of the foreign affairs department in the Front, who is currently visiting Lebanon. He showed in detail that the struggle against the Moroccan monarchy regime is part of the struggle against the region's supporters of Camp David, since Hasan II regularly receives weapons from Sadat in order to suppress the POLISARIO Front revolutionaries.

Nur-al-Din Ahmad does not expect to arrive at a political settlement of the Western Sahara problem in the near future. Right now he is currently visiting Lebanon after first having made a visit to Jordan, where he met the minister of information and the deputy foreign minister, and then going to Syria, where he met with the Baath Party Regional Command's head of foreign relations and members of the Progressive National Front in Syria. His last stop is now Lebanon, where he meets various groups from among the patriotic ranks of the Lebanese and Palestinians.

At the same time there are delegates of the POLISARIO who are touring the Arab countries in order to explain the position of the people of Western Sahara. Nur-al-Din Ahmad speaks with bitterness about the attitude of the Arab countries which are still hesitating to support this just cause. He explains that out of a total of 32 countries, only 2 have supported Western Sahara's independence, and they are Algeria and Democratic Yemen.

Here is the interview in detail:

[Question] What is your opinion about the efforts which are now surfacing in the direction of arranging mediation between Algeria and Morocco concerning the Western Sahara problem?

[Answer] Our view is that any mediation, whatever the source and whatever the integrity of the person undertaking it, if it does not take into consideration the principal party involved in the conflict, which is the people of Western Sahara, led by the POLISARIO Front within the framework of the Democratic Sahara Republic, then it will fail just as previous mediation failed.

The Military Situation

[Question] Could you currently give us a picture of the military situation in the Sahara, especially after the famous Lebouirate battle in which Hasan II's army was defeated and which had repercussions inside the Moroccan army itself?

[Answer] As far as we are concerned, the Lebouirate battle was just an ordinary battle like others before it and after it. There were battles before Lebouirate, [such as] the Bir Enzarane battle which resulted in 175 dead in the Royal Moroccan Army, including 4 lieutenants, and in the capture of big quantities of weapons and ammunition. And as far as the length of the operation is concerned, the battle lasted from 5 A.M. to 4 P.M., and 11 Moroccan airplanes took part. In spite of this the result was the capture of large quantities of weapons and a great number of soldiers were taken prisoner. This battle came after [sic] the battle at Lebouirate which is considered one of the most important Moroccan army bases and which is 140 kilometers inside Moroccan territory. In that battle we destroyed 65 tanks, mined and blew up 39 military vehicles, and took 92 Moroccan soldiers prisoner, including a group of officers.

There was also the Zag battle which resulted in 40 prisoners taken and the capture of large quantities of weapons and ammunition plus a large number of vehicles. There have been battles smaller than these, but because of a boycott by the Arab press you have not received any news about them. The Western press sees the prisoners. After every operation, foreign journalists come and see the prisoners and the booty. It is the responsibility of free Arab writers to transmit the truth to their Arab readers, the truth about an Arab revolution to Arab citizens.

The Details of the Lebouirate Battle

[Question] Could you give our readers an in-depth description of the Lebouirate battle which took place in the Sahara and which aroused the interest of the whole area?

[Answer] The battle started at 6 A.M., and it lasted one hour, although the base is one of the Moroccan monarchy's largest bases. In it there were 65 tanks and about 400 vehicles, in addition to there being a concentration of troops on the base. Also there were large quantities of weapons. There were Egyptian weapons, from the Eastern bloc, twin 23-millimeter [gun] batteries, launchers with Strela rockets, and most of the soldiers were armed with Eastern bloc and American machine guns. In spite of all this, our Landrovers were able to pursue the tanks and destroy them. The tank commanders were even jumping out of their tanks and fleeing, which shows that morale in the Moroccan army has hit rock bottom. In this battle we captured 139 vehicles, including 50 GMC's, 105 tons of ammunition of various kinds, and ground-to-air and ground-to-ground communications equipment. In addition to this [we captured] a large number of water and fuel storage tanks and about 80 Landrovers. The number of our soldiers who fought was not even one-fourth the number of the [Moroccan] king's soldiers. The base commander, who was executed by the Moroccan monarchy, had been in Rabat 2 days before the battle took place, but they held him responsible, making him the scapegoat, in order that the Moroccan regime justify its losses and picture the problem on a personal level. We have all of the telegrams which were sent back and forth between Rabat and the base, particularly since the deputy base commander is one of our prisoners, and he has already been photographed by the press. We also seized all the base documents that have appeared since the base was established, in addition to all of the instructions issued by the king.

The King Is Preparing for a Military Adventure

[Question] Do you expect Hasan II to undertake a large military adventure in the Sahara area?

[Answer] He is always promising this, and all of his actions are suicidal in the Sahara. [Look at] the troop concentration with which he attacks us, using weapons from various countries. As you know, Morocco has raised the cry of pursuit, and claims that it has issued orders to pursue the Polisario, but our answer to Morocco is that instead of pursuing us in Algerian territory, let them pursue us instead inside Morocco, where we have deeply penetrated.

[Question] What is your opinion about Hasan II's formation of what is called the "Aosario" Front, and has it so far undertaken any action worth mentioning?

[Answer] This reminded us of 1974 when we were fighting Spain. The Moroccan monarchy created a movement, calling it the Morehob movement, and asked it to issue a communique about every operation that we undertook. One time there was an occasion international in scope, and they were asked to prepare a military communique about an operation that they were undertaking, so they resorted then to organizing an operation in the area (Batih). This area (Batih) is located in Moroccan territory, is under Moroccan rule, and the Moroccan army is stationed there. The Moroccan press ridiculed this operation.

[Question] So Hasan II has done this sort of thing before?

[Answer] He is an expert at creating fictitious organizations. He began this during the war of attrition against Algeria. But this reminds me of a speech made by the late President Boumedienne. In Khartoum Boumedienne said: "We can give people weapons and money, but we cannot make people want to die. Morocco can give money and arms, but it cannot persuade people to die or not to die. Therefore, organizing a movement hostile to Algeria is an operation which will fail."

The Role of France Against Us

[Question] Could you explain the reasons that led Mauritania to make peace agreement with the Front? And are the latest political developments in Mauritania connected to the peace made with the Front?

[Answer] I do not think that the latest developments in Mauritania have any connection with the peace treaty with the Front. We should bear in mind, though, that the former president, Mukhtar Quld Daddah, was a reactionary figure with ties to Morocco. But the reasons which led Mauritania to retreat from its previous position with regard to Western Sahara are to be found in the great losses which were inflicted upon it militarily and economically. During its war with us Mauritania lost more than 30,000 men who were killed, wounded, or missing in action. Also, its mines were at a standstill, and this had a repercussion even on the French economy. For this reason, at the beginning, French planes resorted to pursuing our revolutionaries after every operation which was carried out during the day. So we changed our methods and organized night raids. It was because of this change [in tactics] that France's ability to help was hindered.

Morocco Is Very Well Armed, But Its Morale Is Low

[Question] How do you currently assess the balance of power in Western Sahara?

[Answer] In terms of numbers and arms, our arms are not equal to one thousandth of the arms of the Moroccan monarchy. As you know, America and France pour arms into Morocco on a scale which the human mind cannot imagine, and lately Sadat [has started doing this]. Up till now 2 ships and 11 plane loads of weapons and ammunition have gone to the Moroccan monarchy. And there are Egyptian military advisers for drawing up military plans for confronting our revolution, sent by Sadat to help Morocco.

But in terms of morale, during the last 4 years of fighting we have been able to greatly wear down the Moroccan army and to bring its morale way down. This has caused it to show no resistance to our courageous operations which, up till now, have resulted in [our taking] 2,000 prisoners, and

this is the best proof of the victories that we are achieving over forces which are armed to the teeth and in great numbers.

Our Cause Is Just

There is also another factor, and that is the factor of justice, the justice of the cause. Our soldiers are fighting for the sake of their established right to return to their lands and to have their families return to their homeland. This is a basic incentive and a stimulating factor, such that either they are victorious or they will be martyrs for the sake of their rights.

As for the Moroccan army, it is an invading, occupying army, and has no incentive at all and no drive or stimulus to fight.

[Question] There is an assessment according to which Morocco is heading toward a military defeat in the Sahara, the indication of this being the fact that it has lately been asking the Egyptian regime to supply it with weapons. Also it has threatened to join the Camp David group in the area, as a countermeasure to redress making up for its expected military defeat. What is your opinion about that?

[Answer] There is no doubt that an unjust war waged by any regime, against a people for the sake of usurping their rights, will be a failure like all other wars [of this type]. The examples of Vietnam, Portugal in its African colonies, and France in Algeria, are the best proof of this. And Morocco will fail because it is waging an unjust war.

The large-scale operations that we are engaging in are the best indication of the Moroccan monarchy's future failure in Western Sahara. And the military defeats are having repercussions on the political and social situation inside Morocco. Hasan II's seeking aid from Sadat falls within the framework of breaking up Sadat's isolation and creating a breach in Arab solidarity, especially since Hasan II is the standard bearer for Jerusalem. This constitutes the vanguard of a reactionary trend which is rallying around Camp David, American policy in the area, and world Zionism.

[Question] Are there any indications that the Arab League wants to intervene in the Western Sahara issue? And do you expect to arrive at a political settlement with the Moroccan regime in the near future?

[Answer] Concerning what you said about a settlement of the issue with Morocco, we have already called upon Morocco to follow a policy like that which Mauritania is following in Western Sahara. [Mauritania] made a permanent peace agreement with the Front and put a permanent end to the war. This is the model for a settlement, and if that is the basis, then our doors are open. Every day we are appealing [for Morocco] to follow the example of Mauritania, considering that Morocco's pretexts concerning Western Sahara are the same as those of Mauritania.

[Question] Do you expect that a political settlement is unlikely at the present time?

[Answer] The Moroccan monarchy is still demonstrating a degree of obstinacy as a result of the dollars it has been receiving from some Arab sources, to support it in this war, in addition to the weapons it gets from America and others.

[Question] And finally a personal question concerning you. Could you tell us something about, for example, your educational background?

[Answer] I grew up in Western Sahara, and I have been involved in this revolution since 1973. Many of my comrades graduated from various universities in the world and then joined the Front, but all of them then had to graduate from the university of revolution and combat in Western Sahara. I have a good command of Spanish and French in addition to Arabic.

Mediation Efforts

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 18 Oct 79 p 10

[Interview with Nur-al-Din Ahmad 'Ali, political bureau member and foreign relations official of the POLISARIO, by Salih Qallab; date and place not given]

[Text] Nur-al-Din Ahmad 'Ali, a member of the political bureau of the Polisario Front who is presently visiting Beirut, denied that any Arab authority was engaging in any contact with the Front within the framework of what is being constantly talked about concerning Arab mediation in finding a peaceful solution to the problem of the Sahara conflict. In an interview with him done by AL-SAFIR he said: "These efforts at mediation are like previous efforts at mediation since 1975, all of which have looked at the problem of the Western Sahara from the point of view of the Moroccan regime, that is, considering the conflict in this issue to be an Algerian-Moroccan border conflict."

"Since these mediation efforts do not look at the core of the problem, from the point of view of the Saharan people's right to self-determination on the basis of decisions made by international organizations, the UN and the [Organization of] African Unity, and [on the basis of] non-alignment, then they are bound to fail."

He went on to say: "We hope that those who are making efforts to mediate will follow Mauritania's example for seeking a solution, bearing in mind that Mauritania, Morocco's partner in war, invasion, and in the Madrid agreement, has shown Morocco the way."

"We hope that all mediators will be serious in seeking a just and peaceful solution which will restore rights to those whose rights and borders have been violated. We are prepared to cooperate just as we cooperated with the Committee of Wise Men which visited the Sahara, Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria."

"And we have proven our sincere desire to bring about a just peace and to eliminate the danger of a war which would envelope the whole area."

Concerning the attitudes taken by Algeria and Libya toward these mediation efforts, he said: "As far as Algeria is concerned, it has assured the mediators that there is no conflict between it and Morocco, that the conflict is between the royal Moroccan regime and the people of Western Sahara, and that Algeria will not follow the example of Sadat who put himself in the position of speaking on behalf of the Palestinian people." And he added: "As for Libya, our Libyan brothers are always assuring us of their respect for the right of the Saharan people to determine their own future, and they never [assume the right to] speak on behalf of the Saharan people."

Nur-al-Din Ahmad 'Ali summarizes the POLISARIO's position with regard to the political actions taken toward solving the Sahara problem by saying: "We consider that the Western Sahara problem is a question of liquidating colonialism, and requires a political solution. We have made an appeal for this solution a number of times and have continually called on the West [Morocco] to renounce its fanaticism, not to follow a policy of war, and to pursue a policy of peace and of removing the spectre of war from the whole area. This can be done by entering into direct negotiations with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Rio de Oro and Saguia el Hamra, in its capacity as the basic party concerned in the conflict and as the sole representative of the Saharan people," "If the Moroccan monarchy wants to extricate itself from its involvement, then it has to recognize the rights of the Saharan people and follow the example of Mauritania, its former partner in war."

"Mauritania, under the leadership of Ould Daddah, fought against us for 3 years, but finally recognized the rights of the Saharan people and the futility of the war. Then it pursued the path of direct negotiations with the Front, and the result was the peace agreement between Mauritania and the POLISARIO, in accordance with which Mauritania withdrew to its former borders of 1960."

"If the Moroccan regime can overcome its vanity complex, then the door is open and we are ready to forget the past. But if it chooses to continue waging war, then its fate will be no better than that of Ould Daddah, and the truth will triumph just as it has in Vietnam, Algeria, and everywhere else."

No Algerian Troops

In reply to Morocco's accusations that Algerian troops are fighting in the ranks of the POLISARIO Front, Nur-al-Din Ahmad 'Ali says:

"We have already been fighting against the Moroccan regime for 4 years, and challenge the Moroccan regime to produce even a single witness who could prove that foreigners are fighting in the ranks of the POLISARIO."

"The Moroccan regime used to claim that we were a group which the Spanish set up as their successors, then it claimed that we were agents of Libya, then it said that we were mercenaries for Algeria, and then we were described as Cuban and Angolan agents. Finally it said that we were a group of Mauritians."

Concerning Morocco's statement that the Saharan people do not have the capability to continue a large-scale war on a high technological level, he pointed out that Sadat, when he tried to invade Libya, claimed that it would be 50 years before the Libyans had the technical ability to use the advanced weapons that they had.

"At that time Sadat talked about Soviet and Cuban advisers that were active in the ranks of the Libyan armed forces. This was a justification for his aim of invading Libyan territory."

2,000 Prisoners

He continued, saying: "Right now we have approximately 2,000 Moroccan prisoners whom we have shown to journalists. Why is it that the Moroccan regime cannot point to even one foreigner among those that it claims are fighting in our ranks, although the communiques which it issues talk about the thousands of Saharans killed and taken prisoner?"

We Are Not Part of Morocco

In reply to opinions which have suggested that the POLISARIO needs to declare the Sahara area a liberated part of Morocco in order to get the Moroccan opposition parties to rally around it, he said:

"We are part of the Arab nation, but we are not part of the Kingdom of Morocco, and it is not possible for us to allow the Moroccan opposition to impose its nationality on us so that it can cooperate with us."

He denied that the POLISARIO Front had any connection with the strike organized by the Moroccan opposition, but he indicated a connection with some secret groups inside the army as well as with some organizations whose activities are forbidden inside Morocco.

Also he denied the existence of any Moroccan soldiers in the ranks of the POLISARIO Front, and said: "Up till now we have not been in need of any military assistance, either from Moroccan parties or from Algeria or Libya."

He assured us that victory for the revolution in Western Sahara will strengthen progressive forces in the Arab West [Maghreb] and will be a victory for progressive forces in Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania.

The Moroccan Opposition

The member of the POLISARIO Front's political bureau violently criticized the legal Moroccan opposition, saying that it has made itself a tool of the Moroccan regime, both on the military and political plane. He predicted that the Moroccan king would resort to making the opposition responsible for the defeat which it will suffer in the Western Sahara war.

He said: "Even if the Moroccan opposition does consider the Western Sahara to be part of Morocco, does this mean it should put itself in the king's lap..?"

"Logic compels it, if it is seriously in opposition to the King and his regime, to utilize the opportunity, deliver a fatal blow, and set up a progressive regime which would make it easy for us and for them to solve the Sahara problem."

In conclusion he emphasized the fact that 24 countries recognize the Popular Democratic Saharan Arab Republic, of which only two are Arab countries, namely Algeria and the Democratic Republic of Yemen.

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WESTERN SAHARA

POLISARIO REPRESENTATIVE IN SPAIN RAPS SPANISH STAND ON SAHARA

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 12 Oct 79 p 2

[Statement by POLISARIO representative in Spain Ahmed Boujari made in Barcelona; date not specified]

[Text] The Communist proposal to recognize the POLISARIO Front as the legitimate representative of the people of Sahara was rejected at the Wednesday session of the Congress of Deputies by majority votes of the centrists and members of the UCD [Democratic Center Union]. The Spanish delegation attending the U.N. World Federation of Trade Unions Assembly made a motion on the Saharan question in which it proclaimed the Saharan people's inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Ahmed Boujari, the POLISARIO Front representative in Spain, discussed the significance this motion could have for his people with the editorial staff of MUNDO OBRERO.

"For us," Boujari said, "it is of concrete importance since it stems from an initiative of the Spanish branch of the Association of Friends of the United Nations. This is logical and natural and is of concrete importance from our point of view to the extent that there is permanent and continuous solidarity among the different Spanish political forces. Secondly, it is also of widespread importance since there are some United Nations reports that concretely recognize the Saharan people's right to independence and the more these resolutions, which take note of the legitimate claim of a people, are extended and made public the more they help the Saharan people in their struggle."

Relations Should Improve

Ahmed Boujari severely criticized the Spanish Government's position on the Saharan question: "...the Span'sh Government persists in its policy of not wishing to assume its responsibility in the Saharan issue and not wishing to officially recognize a reality that is being recognized throughout the world. I think that relations between the POLISARIO Front and the Spanish Government should improve. All the conditions required for them to improve exist, especially when we consider the situation realistically, inasmuch as it is not a very friendly gesture to merely offer the Saharan people the Madrid

tripartite agreement in order to then request of them privileged relations without adopting any positive position on the conflict until it comes to an end. On this playing field," Boujari went on, "I believe Spain has the ball and history bears witness to the acts of governments. But let Spain assume responsibility for a decision, in one direction or another. Since it has blackened the past, the present is very gray and, if it continues to remain so, I believe that the future holds no hope for cooperation and friendship between these two peoples, united by a common history and cultural relations. We have devoted 3 years to offering the hand of friendship. I believe that up to now we have not received an appropriate response.

"The Madrid tripartite agreement," the POLISARIO Front representative in Spain said, "has legalized Morocco and Mauritania's war of aggression against the Saharan people. Denunciation of the agreement is important because only in this way can there be peace in the area. However, the Spanish Government has not yet denounced it and that constitutes a serious matter."

Referendum in Sahara

The chief requirements for a just solution to the conflict are considered in the document presented to the U.N. World Federation of Trade Unions Assembly. It states that the assembly of the various unions proclaims the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence, as well as to respect for the inviolability of the colonial borders.

In the same way, the Spanish motion petitions the government to assume the characteristics of the Spanish State as an administrative power, with all the consequences pertaining thereto, which implies: 1. denunciation of the Madrid agreements; 2. recognition of the POLISARIO Front; 3. negotiations designed to achieve self-determination; 4. condemnation of Morocco for its annexation of Sahara.

Jointly with Great Britain, the Spanish delegation requests that a referendum be conducted, with the agreement of the United Nations, and the prior withdrawal of Moroccan troops. The document recognizes "the legitimacy of the struggle carried out by the Saharan people against Moroccan acts of violence and the legitimate right of the [two] states to provide them with aid in the event they should request it."

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WESTERN SAHARA

FORMER MOROCCAN DEPUTY SAID TO HAVE GOOD INFORMATION ON SAHARA

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 16 Oct 79 p 2

[Article by special correspondent Felix Bayon: "Mohamed Ali, deputy for Smara in the Moroccan Parliament: 'Morocco Uses Egyptian Mig-17's in Sahara'"]

[Text] Tinduf (Algeria)—While the Moroccans were recently accusing the POLISARIO of using Cubans and East Germans to command its troops, the POLISARIO Front called a press conference including a dozen reporters from various countries to put Mohamed Ali Uld Sid El Bachir, the Moroccan Parliament deputy for Smara who recently defected from Morocco to join the Saharan refugee camps in Southern Algeria, on display. Mohamed Ali made a number of disclosures on foreign participation in the Moroccan Army. He said that there are Egyptian and American experts and confirmed the presence of the French, which last bit of information has been known since a small group of special correspondents had an opportunity to gain access to Moroccan military documents that had fallen into the hands of the POLISARIO after the battle of Lebuiat. Also, several Moroccans taken prisoner during the battle of Smara have confirmed what the ex-deputy said about the presence in the fighting of Soviet-made Mig-17's that allegedly reached Morocco by way of Egypt.

Since last week, the Saharan refugee camps in Southern Algeria have a new resident, Mohamed Ali Uld Sid El Bachir. Up until a few days ago, Mohamed Ali had one after another held a long list of political offices of regional importance in the Moroccan Government: deputy for Smara, mayor of the abandoned city of Ambala, delegate of the Interior Ministry, delegate of the Moroccan Red Half Moon (equivalent to the Red Cross)...

Mohamed Ali's political and administrative influence goes back a long way. As early as the final years of the Spanish colonial era, he worked for the El Aaiun Department of Labor Supervision. Up until a few days ago when, at the same time the battle of Smara was in progress, he decided to defect to the POLISARIO, Mohamed Ali was apparently a man who had access to the innermost circles of Moroccan politics. Judging from statements he made last Saturday to a group of reporters from different parts of the world, Mohamed Ali also enjoyed great freedom of movement. His membership in

the Moroccan parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee also kept him supplied with good information on the course of the Saharan war.

"With my own eyes," Mohamed Ali said, "I saw a delegation of American and Egyptian soldiers in El Aaiun at the end of last month. Before and during this year, there have been three or four more American and French military missions in El Aaiun. In addition to the Egyptian-American delegation, a group of from 17 to 20 French soldiers could be seen in El Aaiun. Shortly before the Saharan attack on Smara, there was another French military delegation, this time composed of 13 men."

On the same Saturday we spoke to Mohamed Ali, we also had an opportunity to interview a group of Moroccan prisoners captured during the battle of Smara. Among the aircraft that hastened to defend the city, some of them noted the presence of "a group of black planes that we had never in our lives seen."

These "black planes" were probably the Mig-17's (Soviet planes presumably sold through Egypt) that Mohamed Ali said he too had seen at El Aaiun Airport. "The Mig pilots were not Moroccans." Perhaps the pilots were Egyptians? "I don't know," Mohamed Ali said, "but what I do know is that they were not Moroccans."

Having kept his eyes open in connection with his political contacts, Mohamed Ali said he had seen Colonel Dlimi, the military right arm of King Hassan II, shortly after the battle of Lebuirat. "Dlimi told me he had submitted his resignation to the king and that the latter had replied: 'If you submit your resignation to me, to whom can I, who am the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, submit it?'"

According to Mohamed Ali, he recently was able to engage in several more conversations with Colonel Dlimi, who admitted to him that "there was already no area in Sahara that was safe for the Moroccans," that, "if it loses Sahara, Morocco runs the risk of possible Rif and Berber independence movements" and that "Moroccan superior officers are traitors and it would be necessary to set up a mixed general staff, composed of Moroccans and foreigners."

The former Moroccan deputy also said that the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, whose meetings he attended, had described the occupation of Dajla (formerly Villa Cisneros) after it was abandoned by the Mauritians as "improvised."

Mohamed Ali also disclosed that the Moroccans had begun to concentrate part of the nomadic population of the area south of their original borders, where they are receiving weapons and military training. According to what an important Saharan leader told us, Morocco could try to exploit old tribal differences to get the nomads in the southern part of the country to take part in the war.

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WESTERN SAHARA

BACKGROUND, CURRENT SAHARA SITUATION REVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 8-14 Oct 79 pp 20-22

/Article by Qusayy Salih al-Darwish: "Has the King Seized Tiris El Gharbia To Give It Up in Exchange for Peace?"

/Text/ Mauritania's withdrawal from the conflict over Western Sahara has led to substantial new developments in the parameters of this issue. Some of these developments affect the situation between Morocco and Algeria in the wake of the Rabat government's bold annexation of Tiris El Gharbia. Others affect the situation in the region of the Arab Maghrib. Still others affect the Arab situation in general, following Sadat's expression of readiness to offer military assistance to Morocco in its war against the POLISARIO and Morocco's acceptance of this offer. The latter may represent a break in the isolation which the Egyptian regime has experienced in the Arab world since the signing of the separate peace accords.

The following is a special report to AL-DUSTUR presenting the background up to the present moment in the Western Sahara conflict.

The battles which have recently occurred in southern Morocco and the serious casualties which have been inflicted on the Moroccan Royal Army indicate that the Sahara problem has arrived at a dangerous threshold where all possibilities have become thinkable--from an all-out war in the region to a series of new military uprisings in the neighboring countries involved in the Sahara problem.

Although from the formal standpoint Morocco appeared to have won a victory--or a progressive step of the same importance--by annexing the region of Tiris El Gharbia (that portion of the Sahara joined to Mauritania in accordance with the trilateral Madrid Agreement which decreed that the Sahara would be partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania, with Spain's consent), the tone and statements of Moroccan officials point to an

anxiety-filled situation. In this connection, diplomatic circles friendly to Morocco confirm that the Moroccan leadership has come across no alternative to imposing its control by force on the Tiris El Gharbia region, having found itself in an unenviable position following the signing of the peace agreement between Mauritania and the POLISARIO prior to last month. This agreement was signed following the resumption of negotiations between the two sides after Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haicalla took over as Mauritanian prime minister and in the wake of concentrated diplomatic activity in this direction. This activity included the participation of Algiers and Libya, and reached its climax in a meeting between President Chadli Bendjedid and Colonel Haidalla in Monrovia. According to the recent Mauritanian-Saharan agreement, Mauritania is to withdraw from the entire problem--thus relinquishing its share of the Sahara--in the interests of the right of self-determination, which forms the POLISARIO Front's main slogan.

In effect, this agreement has reshuffled the cards for the sides involved in the conflict. For despite the severe defeat which Morocco suffered with the fall of Mokhtar Ould Daddah's regime on 10 July 1977 and the arrival of a group of young officers sympathetic to the POLISARIO Front, it was able to regain its breath when its supporters on the Military Committee for National Salvation [CMSN] were successful in removing the young officers from the government. The crowning of this success came when Col Ahmed Ould Bouseif took over as prime minister and amended the CMSN charter, stripping its president, Col Mostefa Ould Mohamed Salek, of all his powers. Bouseif's success was seen at the time as a victory for the policy of self control and quiet diplomacy pursued by the government of King Hassan II. Indeed, Bouseif repeated all the steps which he had taken during his tenure in the previous government as minister of fishing. After reshuffling the cabinet to remove individuals opposed to Moroccan policy, Bouseif eliminated their supporters from other sectors of the state, especially in the information and local administration sectors. He also released the ministers who had been arrested with former President Mokhtar Ould Daddah, and pursued those individuals who had been forced either to disappear inside the Sahara or flee outside the country. Nevertheless, Ould Bouseif was unable to back away from what was termed the call for peace and create a new dynamism to achieve it, although in spite of this he pressed particularly for a strategic alliance with Morocco, France and Senegal, and granted Mauritians who were friendly to these states special distinctions. These included the likes of Smail Ould Oumar, former director of the Mines Company and personal friend of Rothschild. Prior to Bouseif's arrival as prime minister, Smail had called for Mauritania's eventual union with the region of Northwest Africa, which would unite into an area subject to France, as an alternative to Mauritania's historical membership in the Arab Maghrib. Moreover, he urged Morocco to launch an offensive war against Algeria in order to end the Saharan problem. This policy strengthened Morocco and weakened the position of the Saharans. However, the death of Colonel Bouseif in an airplane accident near Dakar moved things back to the starting point, after he had left the Mauritians, Saharans and Algerians with a new conviction of the seriousness of allowing the Mauritanian position to remain paralyzed.

Who Killed Bouseif?

Before examining the development of conditions at greater length, it is necessary to dwell briefly on the death of Colonel Ould Bouseif. That is to say, his death does not provide a complete outline of the situation, in spite of all the changes it produced. The official statement which was announced in Nouakchott and corroborated by Dakar spoke of how the military plane boarded by the Mauritanian official crashed just after a storm blew over the coast of Senegal. However, AL-DUSTUR has obtained documented information which confirms that the plane crash was not by fate and divine decree as announced, but was a planned operation to assassinate Ould Bouseif. Informed Mauritanian sources add that the plane's pilot, who was a captain, had intended to make a parachute drop and leave the plane carrying Bouseif and his companions to crash on its own, but for one reason or another he was unable to make the drop and was killed along with the others. This belief is reinforced by the report from Dakar that the Senegalese police had discovered two bombs at Dakar Airport around the time when Bouseif's plane was expected to land. If this information is accepted, one must wonder about the possibility that an organized agency directed the planning of the airplane accident. Informed Mauritanian agencies deny this, however, and feel that it was an individual operation, with a possibility that one or more individuals in addition to the captain who piloted the aircraft carried it out. These agencies justify this view by saying that the majority of Mauritians were not satisfied with Ould Bouseif's policy, which would have kept Mauritania a setting for a war between other sides. Moreover, this view also takes into consideration the evident family and tribal sympathies the Mauritians have with the Saharan population, as well as their historical fear of Morocco and its intentions--intentions which some Moroccan politicians continue to express and which are presented by the idea that Mauritania is a part of Morocco and must inevitably be rejoined to it.

For these reasons, the same 10 July Movement had remained prevalent despite the expulsion of their leaders, and no sooner had Ould Bouseif died than Lt Col Maouya Ould Taya was nominated for the Mauritanian prime ministership. Ould Taya bowed out, however, preferring to remain in the military wing of government out of fear of a repetition of the tragedy of Jiddou Ould Salek, who carried out a revolution and was exiled after leaving the army and taking over the Ministry of Interior. It is worth mentioning that Lt Col Ould Taya--and this fact is published exclusively by AL-DUSTUR--resigned from the previous military committee and government in protest of the expulsion from the administration of the so-called "elements sympathetic to the POLISARIO," which included Jiddou Ould Salek, Mohamed Yehdih Ould Breideleil and Sidi Ahmed Bnejara. Maouya Ould Taya thus became the first minister to resign from the government in the history of independent Mauritania. After Maouya's rejection of the prime ministership, Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla was elected to this office, which became the top position in the government and the state after the CMSN constitution, which had been amended by Bouseif, restricted the role of the president of the CMSN to directing committee meetings only--in other words, to purely formal and protocol-related duties.

Toward Agreement

While Lt Col Mohamed Ould Louly was appointed president of the CMSN, Lt Col Ould Taya was appointed commander of the National Gendarmerie, which is considered the main force with respect to the internal situation in Mauritania since for many years it has remained far more important than the army in terms of strength, equipment and training. Haidalla attempted to gain time as Mostefa Ould Mohamed Salek had done before him. In other words, he continued to raise slogans of peace while clinging to the friendship of Morocco and maintaining some formal contacts with the POLISARIO Front, waiting for Morocco to find a solution satisfactory to all sides. However, Ould Haidallah was surprised with a change in the position of the POLISARIO, on the one hand, and that of the Moroccan Government on the other. The POLISARIO began demanding that Mauritania make the discussions between the two sides public and establish a clearer position on the problem. In this connection, the POLISARIO publicized the details of discussions which had taken place between its representatives and a Mauritanian delegation in Tripoli, as well as the agreement which was reached between the two sides. This embarrassed the Mauritanian Government before Morocco, and it was forced to deny the report of the meeting. The POLISARIO Front was then prompted to announce the lifting of the ceasefire on the Mauritanian border which the front had imposed unilaterally during the 10 July Movement in Mauritania. As for Morocco, it did not hide its misgivings about the new Mauritanian leaders, while prompting its officials to demand specific guarantee pertaining to the Mauritanian position. This situation undoubtedly hastened the developments which compelled Mauritanian officials to make their ultimate decision, by agreement with the Saharans, which was to vote for the resolution adopted by the OAU conference in Monrovia. This decision led to a meeting between President Chadli Bendjedid and Ould Haidalla in the same city, and this was followed by a series of statements by the Mauritanian ministers of information and foreign affairs concerning Mauritania's wish to withdraw from Rio de Oro, generally known as Tiris El Gharbia, and its support for the right of self-determination. This brought about increased tension on the Moroccan front, especially since POLISARIO fighters began to intensify their operations on this front. In the meantime, while passing through Paris on its way to Algeria, a Mauritanian delegation under the leadership of CMSN Secretary Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi met with Lt Col Ahmed Ould Abdelkader. Abdelkader had been considered one of the strongest officers during the Bouseif era. After Bouseif's death, he resigned as minister of education, a post which had been entrusted to him by Ould Haidalla, and fled from Nouakchott, seeking refuge first in Senegal and then in Morocco, although the Moroccan Government denied it at the time. It is generally known that Ould Abdelkader and Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi are linked by a strong bond of friendship, and it was this bond which prompted Abdelkader to come to Paris to meet with Ould Sidi. At the meeting, Abdelkader proposed to Ould Sidi that a military action be staged which would gain the support of the Moroccan forces stationed in the area, but the delegation head excused himself from this on the pretext that the situation in Nouakchott was not conducive to such a move, and that any military action in which Morocco participated would tend to encounter a hostile attitude

on the part of the Mauritians. Nevertheless, he did promise that they would take a positive stand on any move which was made provided that he not have an active role in its execution. He then continued on his way to Algeria to sign the peace agreement with the POLISARIO. It appears that Haidalla chose Ould Sidi personally for this mission to block him from taking any other position, since he had been a protégé of the Bouseif-Abdelkader group.

The Surprise

The signing of the agreement was a surprise to everyone, including Algeria. It cast Morocco in the role of the victim and Mauritania in the role of the killer. Amidst the throng of conjectures and the media outcry which followed the agreement, Haidalla headed for Morocco to meet with Hassan II and explain the reasons which had compelled him to take this position. Many people believed that this meeting would tend to modify the Mauritanian position, which had been governed by a phobia of either Morocco or Algeria since Mauritania gained independence, and some did not think it unlikely that Haidalla would retreat from what had been accomplished as his predecessor Mostefa Ould Mohamed Salek had done before him. Mauritians who know Haidalla, however, ruled this out completely. Because as they put it, Haidalla is not only courageous but courageous to the point of "folly" when he is provoked. This is, in fact, what occurred. After listening to a harsh speech from the Moroccan monarch, Haidalla became even more firm in his position. This caused the go-ahead signal to be given to Lt Col Ould Abdelkader to call a press conference in Rabat in which he criticized Algeria's agreement and revealed the existence of a group of free Mauritanian officers who opposed the existing regime. This press conference prompted Prime Minister Haidalla to cancel an official dinner and leave Morocco that same night, thereby cutting off any possibility of repairing the bridges between his government and the Moroccan regime.

This began a new page in Moroccan-Mauritanian relations, which had remained strained from the time of Mauritania's independence until the signing of the trilateral Madrid Agreement with the regime of Mokhtar Ould Daddah, whose downfall was one of the direct results of this agreement. As one young Mauritanian put it, the phase of quiet diplomacy by the Moroccan monarch in his relations with Mauritania ended after he finally lost hope that any internal change in his favor would occur in the short term. For Ould Haidalla was successful in purging the army of a group of colonels which was the cause of the 10 July Movement's deviation from the goals it had set out to accomplish, and he also locked CMSN members likely to be supporters of Morocco into formal and ineffective positions. Outside the government, certain right-wing individuals, especially among businessmen, were arrested, while other individuals, including Smail Ould Oumar, were placed under house arrest. In addition, Ould Daddah's ministers who had been released by Bouseif were returned to prison.

The Only Way

Now, after Morocco's occupation of Rio de Oro and the Moroccan monarch's censure of the Mauritanian leaders, these leaders no longer have any choice but to strengthen their relations with the POLISARIO and Algeria--especially since Morocco is now attempting to move the battlefield far away from the Algerian-Moroccan border and in the direction of Mauritania and Rio de Oro. Moreover, Mauritanian officials are busily engaged in an effort to rectify the economic situation in order to head off their opponents. Colonel Haidalla has halted construction on the palace which Bouseif had started and has imposed comprehensive austerity measures on various state facilities. In addition, he has cancelled the prosecution proceedings against nationalist elements and asked some of them to participate in the government. In fact, Sidi Ahmed Bnejara has been appointed governor general of Nouadhibou Department, which is the most important department in Mauritania because of its position as the foremost economic center in the country and site of the port from which minerals are exported. Bnejara had previously been dismissed from the Ministry of Finance on the charge of sympathizing with the POLISARIO. It is reported that other important government positions will be entrusted to Maj Jiddou Ould Salek and Ould Zamel Bin Breideleil /as published; writer probably meant Ould Zamel and Ould Breideleil/. Meanwhile, the Mauritanian Government has agreed to the nomination of Ahmed Belouafia for the position of assistant secretary general of the Arab League. Belouafia is generally known as one of Mauritania's young and active individuals, and was among the civilian planners of the 10 July Movement. The political forces, meanwhile, have challenged one another to form a quasi-front among themselves, to include supporters of the 10 July Movement, the Ba'th Party and the "Kadihine" who had opposed the regime of Ould Daddah. The front has also won the support of the Nasirites. On the other hand, those known in Nouakchott as the "Toilers of Maryam" (with reference to Ould Daddah's wife) are attempting to goad CMSN President Ould Louly into demanding a change in the charter and broader powers for himself. It is generally known that Ould Louly is a conservative individual who still has a certain amount of presence, although formal, in the government, and his conservatism has reached the point that he takes along his shroud wherever he goes for fear of death.

As for the POLISARIO Front, it has succeeded in enlarging the scale of the fighting inside southern Morocco. Moreover, its agreement with Mauritania will not only permit it to neutralize that country, but Mauritania will become a rear base for the front, and possibly was the front's source of supply for new volunteers, be they Mauritanian position will also increase the degree to which southern Morocco's inhabitants sympathize with the Saharans because of the kinship bonds which connect the Saharans and the Mauritanian tribes. On the diplomatic plane, the POLISARIO feels that it has achieved a series of victories represented by the resolutions of the Monrovia conference and the resolutions expected to be adopted at the Non-Aligned conference. Moreover, there is the recognition of the Saharan republic by both the island of Grenada and Ghana, besides Spain's new position which was recently reiterated by the Spanish foreign minister, who asserted that the Saharan provinces are still international territories and must be granted self-determination, and that his government recognizes the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) as the sole legal representative of

the Saharan people. As for France, the leftist forces there affirm their support for the front, and to their numbers can be added groups within the rightist majority which were the main reason behind the French Government's declaration of support for Mauritania, as if thereby giving its blessings to the agreement that was signed with the POLISARIO Front, among other things. While Algerian diplomacy congratulates itself on its achievements--inasmuch as Algeria finds itself in a strong position following the release of Ben Belala and the granting of permission for Algerian oppositionists to return inside the country--the Moroccan Government finds itself in the worst of situations. For aside from the loss of its ally, Mauritania--which may turn into an adversary--its loss of the support of Spain and many of the African states, and the neutralization of France, the fact that Morocco felt compelled to occupy Rio de Oro will increase the military and diplomatic burdens it has to bear. In fact, the recent battles in southern Morocco, which could recur at any time, reveal the difficult situation into which the Moroccan Government has gotten itself. It has been forced to change the tone of its reports of the fighting, such that for the first time officially it has spoken of indirect accusations against some Moroccan Army officers--if not of collusion with the enemy, at least of slackness in carrying out patriotic duties. It appears that Moroccan leaders are now pushing toward a new policy based on keeping the battles away from the Algerian border unless military considerations related to the balance of forces, hence international political considerations, make this impossible. In both his speech and his press conference, it was noted that the king did not concentrate on Algeria but centered his attack on Libya, instead. The Moroccan press followed this up with accounts of Algerian-Libyan disagreements over the Sahara issue. For example, it published reports stating that the POLISARIO's military command had moved to Tripoli, which had begun to assume all the front's expenses following a withdrawal of assistance by Algeria which thought that the facilitations it had been providing were sufficient. The Moroccan Government also took up other themes, including a certain amount of indirect praise for President Chadli Bendjedid, as in the Moroccan monarch's remark that the possibilities for agreement and meetings are more favorable for success than they were during the time of the late President Houari Boumediene. Moreover, Morocco declared what it termed its readiness to offer concessions to Algeria, including granting it a Moroccan port on the Atlantic Ocean and a corridor connecting the port with Algerian territory. The Moroccan Government's final theme was a report about Cuban forces within an international detachment fighting in the POLISARIO's ranks. The Moroccan monarch termed this detachment the Cuban destabilization forces in Africa.

However, Algeria did not respond to Morocco's offers. The Algerian press asserted that the Moroccan regime had gotten the wrong address, and all it could do was go and knock on the door of the POLISARIO, the only side concerned in the matter. The press followed this up with a violent attack on the Moroccan Government and the Moroccan king personally, as if to prove that any attempts to bypass the POLISARIO Front were futile.

Be that as it may, there was no more talk of the POLISARIO as mercenaries of Algeria as the Moroccan press had been calling them. Rather, the Moroccan king announced that POLISARIO's fighters are Mauritanians, and their seizure

of power in Mauritania is an internal Mauritanian problem. Some Moroccan circles, however, began criticizing Morocco's position on the POLISARIO, one of the effects of which has been to push the POLISARIO toward fighting in the provinces, as well as the Moroccan position on Mauritania, which the Moroccan regime has not treated well.

Today, a new situation has been created in the region. The Moroccan regime now must not only defend Saguia El Hamra, but Rio de Oro and Southern Morocco, as well. Some say that the burden has not changed, since Morocco had taken on the additional duties of defending Mauritania, but those who hold this view forget that the Moroccan forces were in territory considered friendly--at least from the official standpoint--whereas they are now fighting in unfriendly territory, despite the statements made by the Moroccan press to the effect that it was the inhabitants of Rio de Oro who requested protection, declaring their Moroccan identity and acknowledging the king as the sovereign responsible for them and over them. However, the fact confirmed by many observers and visitors is that the Moroccan forces will encounter great difficulty in dealing with the inhabitants of the province, despite the money which has been and will be showered on their leaders and prominent personalities. They recall the residents of Saguia El Hamra who took what they got but have not as of yet cooperated with the government in spite of the urgent need for them in the fighting because of their knowledge of the land and climate. But even the Moroccan regime itself does not trust them. Some Moroccan soldiers stationed in the city of El Aaiun gave this example: "The inhabitants of the city are of two types: the type that buys and sells in purely material transactions, but without exchanging any kind of friendly conversation, and the type that rejects even these commercial dealings." Naturally, this is one of the complicating factors for the Moroccan officials. And now, with the king calling for a summit conference of the states adjacent to the Sahara in order to produce a peaceful solution to the Sahara problem, does he actually expect that the problem will have positive and new horizons? In that case, what could he offer? Has he seized Rio de Oro in order to give it up to the POLISARIO in exchange for peace, on the assumption that he previously acknowledged the Mauritanian identity of this portion of land, and on the other hand acknowledged the Mauritanian identity of the POLISARIO? And if he made this offer, would the front accept it? In an interview with AL-DUSTUR, one member of the front's political office asserted that this is absolutely unthinkable, especially since the front is in a position in which it does not need to offer any concessions, and even if it did need to it would not do this.

After the fighting in the south, the ball is still in Morocco's court. The matter is tied to the position of King Hassan, whom some see as having the courage to remove the Sahara problem from the realm of nationalist one-upmanship in which the Moroccan parties have lost themselves--especially since the consequences of military escalation are not assured, whatever the outcome of the fighting.

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